Commentary No. 4, Nov. 15, 1998
"The Strategy of Saddam Hussein"
The standard analysis of Saddam Hussein is that he is a somewhat megalomaniac dictator who is constantly testing the will of the rest of the world, and the United States in particular, to stop him from his expansionist designs. The basic conclusion one can draw from such an analysis is that if the United States shows sufficient willpower and the political ability to organize the collective willpower of at least a good part of the world community, Saddam Hussein will lose out. Such an analysis and such a conclusion misses the entire point of Saddam Hussein's strategy. Saddam Hussein actually is one of the astutest practitioners of the ancient arts of geopolitics. The key to his strategy is that he is actively seeking to provoke the United States into constant military confrontations, even if his forces come out second-best in each of them in the short run.
Suppose his analysis went in the following way. The existing balance of forces in the contemporary world-system favors in all arenas the major world powers - the United States in particular, Western Europe and Japan secondarily - and that their continuing economic advantage is secured by their control of the world's political structures and their military forces and equipment. Suppose he then assumed that there was no way for the rest of the world to break this stranglehold on advantage without undermining critically the military capacity of the United States as a preliminary to other steps in the geopolitical reorganization of the world-system, such as the creation of a pan-Arab entity of some strength. Suppose finally he assumed that the Soviet Union had been not an element that Iraq could find useful in its long-run strategy but an active obstacle, in that Soviet military power was used less to undo U.S. military power than to constrain countries like Iraq, in order that they not interfere with Soviet arrangements with the U.S.
If he had made such an analysis, as early say as the 1980's, what would he have done? First, he would have taken advantage of oil rent quietly to build his military capacity. Secondly, he would have tried to obtain both Soviet and U.S. beneficence, the former as a political ally and the latter as a bulwark against an Iranian regime considered by the U.S. (and its key Arab allies like Saudi Arabia and Koweit) as the most dangerous element in West Asia. He would therefore have launched a seemingly suicidal war against Iran and maintained it for many years, since it brought in further outside political support, money, and aid in building his own long-term military capacity.
In the meantime, Saddam Hussein was chalking up nationalist credits throughout the Arab world by the constancy of its support for the Palestinian cause. Iraq was after all the only Arab country still technically at war with Israel, never having signed a truce agreement in 1949. This cost little, since Iraq had no common frontier with Israel, but every time there seemed little hope of the creation of a Palestinian state (and this surely was the case in the late 1980's, early 1990's with the breakdown of all talks), Iraqi credibility in the Arab world rose.
Happily for Saddam Hussein, just as the eight-year Iran-Iraq war petered out in a draw (after of course countless casualties), the Soviet Union collapsed. Ah, said Saddam Hussein to himself, now's my chance. With the possibility of Soviet constraint on me and all my allies in the South no longer existing as a practical matter, I can begin to take on the United States directly. Let's see: how about a little invasion of Koweit? This will at one and the same time do three things: satisfy a long-standing Iraqi nationalist claim, erase a significant part of Iraq's external indebtedness, and force an unpleasant choice upon the United States. Why not push forward this chess piece?
The United States was taken aback by the audacity of the move. It took a closer look at Iraqi military strength and upgraded its overall evaluation. It was not sure how to react. This was the moment of Mrs. Thatcher's reputed telephone call to George Bush: This is no time to flinch, George. Was she right? In one sense, absolutely. Had the U.S. flinched, Iraq would still be in Koweit, and its centrality to West Asian politics ensured. It is indeed true that Saudi Arabia might have been next. This scenario reflected Saddam Hussein's vision of himself as the Arab Bismarck (or a new Saladin), reunifying by force, wiles, and diplomacy the Arab world in order to catapult this reunited Arab world onto the world stage as a major player.
The United States went about organizing the response. This was less easy than it seems in retrospect. The U.S. had to convince other Western powers. While the U.K. and a few others went along readily, some were quite reticent, notably but not only France. Nor was the U.S. Congress enthusiastic. Nor were the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. The support of both Congress and the military leadership was reluctant because they both were afraid of the same thing, that a military confrontation would require a long and costly war, costly not only financially but in terms of lives. No one wanted to replay Vietnam.
The U.S. thus really tried diplomacy, finding however that Saddam Hussein was not ready to budge on the essentials. The U.S. thus felt it had no choice but to use military force. The U.S. secured the requisite United Nations resolution, the token military assistance from a series of countries, the crucial agreement of Saudi Arabia to allow their country to be used as a military rear area, and the financial underwriting of four countries (Germany, Japan, Saudi Arabia, and Koweit). With this in hand, the U.S. launched its military action. This was not at all unanticipated by Saddam Hussein. Of course, he would have preferred that the U.S. flinch, but he thought that even if the U.S. engaged in military action, it would lose.
Saddam Hussein did not think the U.S. would lose militarily, but lose politically. And he was not wrong. The U.S. of course did win militarily, and with remarkable swiftness. Koweit was rid of Iraqi forces. Then the U.S. had to decide what to do next. We know the series of decisions the U.S. took: 1) Its forces did not march to Baghdad, but withdrew from Iraq; 2) the U.S. then gave air shelter to the ethnic minorities in the north and the south of Iraq; 3) the U.S. obtained from the United Nations a series of draconian measures designed to force Iraq to dismantle the significant parts of its military apparatus.
Why did the U.S. not march on Baghdad and rout out Saddam Hussein? There were two essential reasons. First, it would have required land military forces, with the probability of high loss of lives, followed by a continuing military occupation. Secondly, there was no obvious group with which to replace the present Iraqi regime. The big risk was a disintegration of Iraq, which would have strengthened Iran even more, and probably endangered Saudi Arabia just as much as Iraq's conquest of Koweit. Almost everyone, from the U.S. armed forces to the Saudi regime, counseled against it, and George Bush followed this advice.
But then what? Then two things: try to secure the overthrow of Saddam Hussein by clandestine action, which the U.S. has no doubt pursued constantly but has failed thus far miserably; and try to dismantle Iraq's major weaponry, which has at best been very partially successful. How has Saddam Hussein been able to hold off the United States? First of all, by a very tight internal regime, which has made it almost impossible to contest him, however much ordinary people have been suffering the consequences of the wars and blockades. Secondly, by seeking to maneuver with the West Europeans, the Russians, and the Chinese to stall the U.S. politically. And thirdly, by trying to provoke the United States, in order to make it again and again choose between demonstrating impotence on the one hand and potential isolation on the world scene on the other. The most effective tactic to pursue the provocation has been to provoke boldly and pull back at the last minute. This minimizes military loss for Iraq while constantly weakening the U.S. position.
So here we are again, and the U.S. had once again no good choice. Saddam Hussein stopped the U.N. control process, and "defied" everyone. President Clinton responded on Nov. 13: "None of us can tolerate an Iraq free to develop weapons of mass destruction with impunity." And then at the very last minute, Iraq said it would once again accept U.N. control. Clinton's statement gets to the core of U.S. concerns and Saddam Hussein's strategy. He quite intends to do just that, develop weapons of mass destruction with impunity. He counts on two things. One is underlying political support in large parts of the world for the idea that there is no legitimacy to a U.S. monopoly on "weapons of mass destruction." And the other is drawing the U.S. into a quagmire bit by bit, and then wearing it down politically (especially in Europe and at home), which he sees as a slow, long-term, but inevitable process. If, in addition, Israeli-Palestinian negotiations should once again break down, he will count further on an upsurge of Arab nationalism behind him.
The U.S. will perhaps in the coming year again bomb Iraq, and no doubt more effectively than in the past. But the same
question will recur. Will the U.S. march on Baghdad? Can the U.S. arrange an overthrow of the regime? Saddam Hussein
believes neither will happen and that, in ten years, his strategy will pay off. Remember, he is not avoiding confrontation
with the United States. He is seeking it, and thriving on it.
Immanuel Wallerstein
[Copyright by Immanuel Wallerstein. All rights reserved. Permission is granted to download, forward electronically or e-mail to others and to post this text on non-commercial community Internet sites, provided the essay remains intact and the copyright note is displayed. To translate this text, publish it in printed and/or other forms, including commercial Internet sites and excerpts, contact the author at iwaller@binghamton.edu; fax: 1-607-777-4315.
These commentaries, published twice monthly, are intended to be reflections on the contemporary world scene, as seen
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