Commentary No. 100 - Nov. 1, 2002
"Lula: Hope Conquered Fear"
On Oct. 28, on winning the Brazilian election, Luis Inacio de Silva ("Lula") told the crowd and the world: "Today, Brazil voted for change. Hope conquered fear." This phrase captures exactly what happened, and underlines how remarkable this event is in a world in which, especially in the last year, fear has been conquering hope almost everywhere.
The editor of the Uruguayan paper, Brecha, hailed this election as "the greatest triumph of the Latin American left in all its history," a rejection of the "bitter taste of the promises of the gurus of the free market." The reaction of popular forces throughout Latin America has been one of joy and marvel. The reaction of the forces of neoliberalism and the spirit of Davos has been one of uncertainty as to what to do. They have waffled. They have explained the triumph by the fact that Lula and his party, the Partido dos Trabalhadores (or PT), "moved to the center." But they are not so sure of that, since the political leaders and the media of the north have been making statement after statement, telling Lula that he must move to the center.
The only comparable event in the last decade has been the triumph of the African National Congress in South Africa in 1994. A look at what has happened there may give us some understanding of what is happening in Brazil. Let me begin with what is comparable in the two situations. First, both represent the triumph of progressive forces, after a very long struggle, in the economically most powerful state in its region - a triumph that seemed most improbable even a decade before. Indeed, as recently as three months ago, most commentators were predicting that Lula would win a plurality in the first round, and be defeated in the second round. Instead he won with 61% of the vote.
In South Africa, the coming to power of the ANC ended the era of apartheid and established majority rule. In Brazil, the coming to power of the PT meant the election of a workers' party in a country in which the middle class had always held the reins of power. In both cases, the vote was overwhelming. In both cases, the transition was peaceful and uncontested by the military which, in both countries, had once played a central (and reactionary) political role.
In both cases, this peaceful transition was made possible not merely by popular support for the winning party but by crucial behind-the-scenes discussions with some key sectors of the business world who gave tacit or even active support to the transition in return for a sort of guarantee that the new government would play by at least some of the world financial rules these business strata thought essential to their survival. In the case of South Africa, eight years later, this deal has held more or less. In the case of Brazil, we may expect the same.
Why was such a deal made? From the point of view of the business strata, the deal was made because a compromise made sense. They feared they would lose considerably in a showdown with a left government, even if eventually they might bring about its downfall. They saw the incoming government (ANC, PT) as run by capable, intelligent persons who had popular support and whose efforts at reform, however radical, would be "reasonable." On the part of the incoming popular forces, they knew they were being elected to bring about improvement in the economic situation of ordinary people, and they feared that a radical withdrawal of large business investment from their country would bring about the opposite, and quite quickly. For both sides, it was a pragmatic arrangement.
The question has been, is today, was it worth it from the point of view of popular forces? Within the ANC and the PT, there were three groups at the moment of accession to power: a group of pragmatic persons, little constrained by ideological commitment, who saw the coming to power and the staying in power as the primary consideration of their policies; a second group, more committed to the historical ideology of the movement, but who also saw the necessity of holding the party together if they were to achieve even part of their objectives; and a third group, quite small, who were ready to condemn and oppose any deviation from a traditional left ideology.
It is this second group who walk the narrowest path, and who have the greatest difficulty in maintaining their compass and their influence. In South Africa, this second group has an institutional base in the so-called partners of the ANC, which are the trade-union federation (COSATU) and the South African Communist Party (SACP). Eight years later, COSATU and the SACP are often publicly critical of the government but remain supportive allies. They have continued to be influential. In Brazil, there is no formal equivalent, although the Movimento dos Sem Terra (MST) may play that role. In both countries, the third group has been thus far extremely small and relatively inconsequential.
There are of course differences between the two situations. When the ANC came to power in 1994, the world-economy was in a relatively better shape, and the South African government was not burdened with commitments to the IMF. Furthermore, the struggle against apartheid had a worldwide resonance which made Mandela into a sort of world culture hero. Both the PT and Lula are less well-known, at least outside Latin America. And while Lula is a very attractive personality, he may not match the world charisma of Mandela.
But, on the other hand, Lula and the PT have some other things going for them. Latin America is turning leftward, as can be seen by what has been happening in Central America, Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, and Argentina among other places. There is a new mood sweeping the continent, and it is the mood of the spirit of Porto Alegre. Lula has incarnated that spirit from the beginning, and he is now in a position to back it with the resources and prestige of the Brazilian government.
If some sectors of the Brazilian business strata are backing him, it is not only as a pis aller, but also because they hope he will reinforce the ability of Brazilian business to stand up to U.S.-controlled multinationals. They hope he will reinforce Mercosur and be a force of constructive resistance to the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA, or ALCA). If the Brazilian military is not unhappy he is elected, it is because they stand in strong opposition to the U.S.-backed Plan Colombia, and hope he will help to stem the spread of the violence.
Lula in power is not Sendero Luminoso or the Chinese Cultural Revolution in power. The PT will be a powerful progressive regime in Latin America's most important country, one of the economically consequential countries in the world-system, a force behind which the Latin American left and center-left can rally in the years to come. Lula may be quite prudent about the financial policies of the Brazilian government. He may nonetheless stand as a real barrier to the neoliberal thrust in Latin America and the world. Not only has hope conquered fear in Brazil but hope engenders hope throughout the world. As the world faces the U.S. invasion of Iraq and the consequent chaotic turmoil this will encourage, Lula's election is a sign that we may fight back.
Immanuel Wallerstein
[Copyright by Immanuel Wallerstein. All rights reserved. Permission is granted to download, forward electronically or e-mail to others and to post this text on non-commercial community Internet sites, provided the essay remains intact and the copyright note is displayed. To translate this text, publish it in printed and/or other forms, including commercial Internet sites and excerpts, contact the author at iwaller@binghamton.edu; fax: 1-607-777-4315.
These commentaries, published twice monthly, are intended to be reflections on the contemporary world scene, as seen
from the perspective not of the immediate headlines but of the long term.]
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