Commentary No. 101 - Nov. 15, 2002
"Bush: Fear Conquered Hope"
Mr. Bush had his way - in the U.S. elections, in the U.N. Security Council. With Lula's victory, hope conquered fear. With Bush's victory, fear conquered hope. There is much satisfaction now in Mr. Bush's administration. They think they can get their program fully carried out. They are counting on a Congress and a Security Council that will continue to follow the Bush agenda. They think they have Saddam Hussein cornered.
What is their agenda? The interesting thing to note is that they have a short-term agenda and a long-term agenda, but absolutely no middle-term agenda. Their short-term agenda within the United States is to satisfy their three constituencies - the economic conservatives, the social conservatives, and the macho militarists. The economic conservatives are interested primarily in two things: lower taxes and reduction of the constraints environmentalist considerations have put on them. The social conservatives are interested in legislating sexuality, harsher penalties for lawbreakers, and freedom to own and use guns. The macho militarists are interested in enhancing U.S. military power and using it.
These short-term objectives can be implemented by making the tax cuts permanent, ending the estate tax, appointing rightwing judges to the federal courts, and invading Iraq. Now that they have the power to do these things, they will do them. The one thing one can say about the Bush administration is that they don't waffle. They only make the concessions they absolutely have to make; otherwise they bulldoze their way through all the forests. No doubt there will be a few obstacles in their way - an occasional difficulty with the Congress (a Senate filibuster or two, a few "moderate" Republicans who hesitate to go all the way on particular bills), an attempt by other countries to interpret Saddam Hussein's future actions less dyspeptically than the version we shall hear from Condoleeza Rice. But the Bush administration's response to obstacles is brutal action to overcome them. And since it seemed to have worked this November, they have no incentive to mend their manners.
But why did it work? It seems clear that the overwhelming answer is fear - the fears of the American people, the fears of the rest of the world. September 11 shook up the American people. But if it did so, it is because they were already anxious, and September 11 simply crystallized a vague sentiment into a pressing concern. The American people are afraid of terrorists; they are afraid of Moslems; they are afraid of strangers. It is the sense that the U.S. is no longer as strong as it once was, is no longer as respected as it once was, is no longer as appreciated as it once was. It is the fear that the American standard of living is in danger - the fear of inflation and of deflation, the fear of losing employment. It is the fear that, as they live longer, they no longer live as well, because the health care for the older part of the population is far weaker than people expect and want. President Bush responds to that fear not by saying there is no problem, but by saying that there is a problem to which he has a remedy - tough, determined action. The Bush administration exudes confidence in itself and this attracts fearful people, enough at least who give their vote to toughness.
Of course, none of this explains how the U.S. got a 15-0 vote in the Security Council for its resolution - one that was a bit watered down no doubt, but nonetheless one that permits the U.S. to proceed and, in due time, to invade Iraq. What accounts for this vote is also fear. But it is not Saddam Hussein who inspired this fear. There is not a single member of the Security Council which, in the absence of the drive by the U.S., would have brought this issue to the table. There is not a single member who really believes that Saddam Hussein poses a short-term threat to the peace of the world, or who thinks that action against Iraq is a priority concern of the world community.
So why did they all in the end vote for the resolution - even France, Russia, and China, even Syria? The answer is very simple. They are all afraid of the Bush administration. It has made it very clear that it will take whatever punitive action it can against any country which gets in its way seriously - not merely Mauritius or Syria, but Germany and Canada. So each of these countries has had to weigh the short-term consequences of defiance. And the price seemed high. Thus, although they wiggled, and got some (not too many) face-saving concessions, in the end they buckled. There was once a time when the friends and allies of the U.S. lined up happily behind U.S. leadership in a world crisis. That time is over. Now they line up unhappily because they are afraid, not of the U.S. in the abstract, but of the Bush administration concretely.
One thing that has made this possible has been the worldwide collapse of the reformist center. There is a remarkable parallel, largely unnoticed in the press, between the last French elections and the last U.S. elections. The initial expectation was that the Socialists would win in France. The initial expectation was that the Democrats would win in the U.S. They both lost the crucial subvote by a very narrow margin. Le Pen edged out Jospin for second place in the first round by a tiny difference. A shift of 50,000 votes in two states of the U.S. would have given the Democrats control of the U.S. Senate.
There was a common factor to the two defeats - the exhaustion of the historic program of the two parties. In both countries, large numbers of voters said that the party no longer stood for anything, that it was trying to imitate the conservatives, while losing its base. This is a reflection of the long-standing decline of the traditional center-left movements, which once dominated the world scene. Following the elections, both parties lack a clear leader and a clear program. They are beset by internal debates about whether they should move further to the center (and try to whittle away votes from the conservatives) or move to the left (and try to recoup the votes of the disillusioned). It is not an easy choice tactically, because either choice will lose as well as gain votes. And neither tactic will work if there is no clear program. But will there be?
So, in the short run, the Bush agenda seems likely to prevail. In the long run, the Bush administration knows too what it wants - few restraints on the acquisition of wealth (no matter how much this results in national and world economic and social polarization); a rollback on the liberal social mores that have been enveloping the world scene; and de facto authoritarian structures, which define democracy as making minor choices among elite groups every few years.
But can they get from the short-term agenda to the long-term agenda? The Bush administration simply assumes that it can; it doesn't waste its time thinking about the middle term. This is its Achilles heel. Can it really contain the havoc the Iraq invasion will cause in Middle East politics? Are average Americans really ready to devote the lives of their children and their money on behalf of Bush's agenda, especially if it doesn't pay off in security and prosperity, which it is unlikely to do? Can the dollar really stand the additional strain on its credibility? Can the U.S. really block nuclear proliferation? Can it really hold in check the populist upsurge that is occurring in Latin America? How soon will China, Japan, and Korea come to terms with each other in ways that the U.S. won't like?
The aggressive opening chess moves of the Bush administration have been spectacular. But have they been wise, even from their point of view? Can fear really triumph over hope for very long?
Immanuel Wallerstein
[Copyright by Immanuel Wallerstein. All rights reserved. Permission is granted to download, forward electronically or e-mail to others and to post this text on non-commercial community Internet sites, provided the essay remains intact and the copyright note is displayed. To translate this text, publish it in printed and/or other forms, including commercial Internet sites and excerpts, contact the author at iwaller@binghamton.edu; fax: 1-607-777-4315.
These commentaries, published twice monthly, are intended to be reflections on the contemporary world scene, as seen
from the perspective not of the immediate headlines but of the long term.]
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