Commentary No. 12, Mar. 15, 1999
"The Expansion of NATO"
On Mar. 12, 1999, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary formally became members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The Poles, of all political persuasions, were ecstatic, the Polish president calling it "the most important day in our history." The Czechs and the Hungarians, while generally positive, were much more restrained in their enthusiasm, and there was even some opposition within each country. The reaction in the old NATO member countries was however quite different. While a few persons cheered, most political leaders seemed to be almost indifferent, a few hostile, and many worried about how to handle Russian fears and discontents. A curious event, this, which seemed so important and aroused so little strongly positive feelings.
It is understandable that the Poles should be so enthused. Poland's Foreign Minister, Bronislaw Geremek, distinguished medieval historian and a major figure in the Solidarnosc movement in the period of its struggle against the Communist government, said that for Poland the entry into NATO marked the final end of the Second World War. That war had started, let us remember, with the German invasion of Poland on Sept. 1, 1939, Great Britain and France declaring war on Germany because of it. Poland was of course overrun by the Germans, and after 1945 was brought under Soviet tutelage. I suppose what Geremek meant is that the West had finally fulfilled the commitment it made to Poland in 1939 by welcoming Poland back into its midst in 1999. For Poland, as to some extent for all east/central European states, admission to NATO is considered a symbolic recognition that these states constitute an intrinsic part of the Western world, which they very much desire for political, military, economic, and cultural reasons. And of course it symbolizes as well protection against Russia, seen as an outside, historically imperialist threat.
Why then so much indifference within the old member countries? Well, for one, there is much indifference to NATO itself as an institution. And the primary reason is obvious. When Dean Acheson, then Secretary of State of the United States, presented the case for NATO fifty years ago, his primary emphasis was on "Soviet obstruction" of the proper working of the United Nations. One cannot say that this is a current issue. Insofar as NATO was an element in U.S. strategy in the so-called Cold War, this factor has completely disappeared from the world scene with the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact that had linked the east/central European countries to the U.S.S.R. militarily.
Why was not NATO dissolved the next day? This good question was never seriously debated publicly, nor to my knowledge even behind closed doors. Yet, it was of course a latent issue, to which the various member countries of NATO reacted differently.
From the point of view of the United States, NATO had had a second function which had been very important. It was a mechanism by which the U.S. kept western European governments from striking out too independently on the geopolitical scene. The U.S. used the argument that it was necessary to keep a united political front as part of the continuing politico-ideological struggle with the Soviet Union. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the U.S. was somewhat distraught that it could no longer use that argument. It sought new ones, and found two. One was that NATO was necessary to contain the so-called rogue states of the rest of the world (such as Iraq or North Korea). Another was that NATO was essential to providing the military muscle to maintain the peace in the Balkan zone.
Neither argument enchanted the west Europeans. For one thing, they did not always agree with the U.S. about the best policy to pursue vis-a-vis such states as Iraq. And secondly, they disliked intensely the arrangement the U.S. offered the west European states in the Balkans: that the U.S. supply airpower and the west European states ground troops. NATO thus became a source of political strain between the U.S. and western Europe.
Why then did not the west Europeans simply let NATO die? The simple answer is that the west Europeans did not have their own act put together. The three main countries - France, Germany, and Great Britain - each had somewhat different visions of short-run tactics and middle-run strategy. Doing something as dramatic as letting NATO die was impossible for them as long as they hadn't made up their mind what to put in its place.
Into the midst of this came the demand from the east/central European states for admission to NATO. The initial reaction of both the U.S. and the west European states was cool, and efforts were made to put the question off for a long time. At that point, the east/central Europeans, and especially the Poles, astutely shifted their campaign from the level of diplomatic negotiations to the level of U.S. internal politics. They mobilized their migrant communities in the U.S. (and the east/central Europeans, especially the Poles, have large communities there) and lobbied hard. The dynamics of U.S. internal politics was such that, once the ball started rolling, there was no way to stop it.
At that point, the west Europeans felt the pressure. Were they to play the role of vetoing the entry of these new members, they risked a deterioration of their diplomatic relations with these countries. The Germans were particularly sensitive about the possible reaction of Poland.
And so it was that everyone voted for the admission of the three countries, but without enthusiasm, and not having any real political or military purpose in mind. Of course, the Russians were upset, and various steps were taken to appease them: the promise that no nuclear weapons would be stationed in the three countries nor any tactical headquarters. More importantly, there was probably a quiet agreement that the admission of still other countries, and in particular that of the three Baltic states, would be delayed indefinitely. No less than Zbigniew Brzezinski virtually wrote this in a Polish newspaper this month. A cynic might note that there are fewer Estonians in U.S. cities than there are Poles. This postponement will relieve not only the U.S. but the west Europeans.
So we are living a momentous event about which there is widespread discomfort, but joy in Warsaw, who will now supply
the main quota of NATO-boosters in the world. What may be more important is the fact that a few days before the
admission of the three countries to NATO, Tony Blair got on the bandwagon of establishing a European army, one that
would be autonomous from NATO (and one almost certain not to include the three newly-admitted NATO members).
Immanuel Wallerstein
[Copyright by Immanuel Wallerstein. All rights reserved. Permission is granted to download, forward electronically or e-mail to others and to post this text on non-commercial community Internet sites, provided the essay remains intact and the copyright note is displayed. To translate this text, publish it in printed and/or other forms, including commercial Internet sites and excerpts, contact the author at iwaller@binghamton.edu; fax: 1-607-777-4315.
These commentaries, published twice monthly, are intended to be reflections on the contemporary world scene, as seen
from the perspective not of the immediate headlines but of the long term.]
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