Comment No. 138, June 1, 2004
"Scandal After Scandal"
Al Gore thundered on May 26: "How dare the incompetent and willful members of this Bush/Cheney Administration humiliate our nation and our people in the eyes of the world and in the conscience of our own people. How dare they subject us to such dishonor and disgrace. How dare they drag the good name of the United States of America through the mud of Saddam Hussein's torture prison." Gore's outrage at the multiplying scandals in Iraq (and Afghanistan) is common currency in most of the world. It has grown strong even in the United States.
No one defends, or hardly anyone, the practices exposed in the multiple military prisons of the United States. There are three different views of what has happened. There is the official position of the Bush administration: the abuses are the work of a few bad apples, all of whom are low-level soldiers, who have violated American values and will be punished for it. There is the view of Al Gore and an increasing proportion of the solid American center: this is the work of the Bush administration, and it is they who should be punished for it. Gore called for the immediate resignation of Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, his three top associates (Wolfowitz, Feith, and Cambone), of National Security Advisor Condoleeza Rice, and CIA Director George Tenet. He stopped short, but just barely, of calling for the impeachment of President Bush. There is a third, minority position, which argues that prison abuses have long been built into the American political culture, and that the military scandals are merely more of the same. I suppose it follows from this position that it is the United States as a whole which should be punished for it. This position does not have much traction inside the United States, but it receives greater attention elsewhere in the world.
If everything were otherwise going well in Iraq, the Bush brush-off of the scandals ("a few bad apples") might prevail. But everything is not otherwise going well. In April, the U.S. launched two important military actions in Iraq - one in Fallujah, the stronghold of Saddam loyalists; and one against Muqtada al-Sadr, the Shi'ite cleric who daily denounces the U.S. As far as one can tell, the strongest military power in the world has lost both battles. In Fallujah, the U.S. was forced to settle for a truce, in which it evacuated the city and turned over power to only mildly-disguised former Republican guards of the erstwhile Saddam regime. And in Najaf, the outcome of the battle between al-Sadr and the U.S. army seems to be a truce, in which the U.S. and al-Sadr will both vacate the city, but without the arrest of al-Sadr or the disbanding of his militia.
Meanwhile, the putative transfer of power on June 30 to an Iraqi government that will be "sovereign" is not proceeding well, or at least it is not proceeding very speedily, with only a month to go. For one thing, there is a not minor debate about what "sovereign" means. The United States seems to take the position that one can be "sovereign" in title, but limited in sovereignty in practice. The U.S. does not wish to limit in any serious way the ability of its occupation forces to continue to pursue their self-appointed tasks in ways they deem best after June 30. It reminds me of the infamous and eminently maladroit pronouncement of General Janssens, who commanded the armed forces of the Belgian Congo, just a few days before the country was to become independent (also on a June 30, but 1960). General Janssens assembled the African troops and wrote on a bulletin board: "After independence = before independence." This did not go over very well, and the result was a mutiny, which started a five-year long civil war and national and international crisis.
In any case, few others seem to share the U.S. definition of "sovereignty". On May 25, Tony Blair, the closest ally of the U.S. in Iraq, said of the post-June 30 period: "If there is a political decision as to whether you go into a place like Fallujah in a particular way, that has to be done with the consent of the Iraqi government and the final political control remains with the Iraqi government." Colin Powell immediately publicly disagreed, saying U.S. (and coalition) forces would remain under U.S. command. And the next day, Blair denied there was a rift, although it is hard to see how the two positions can in reality be reconciled. As to the rest of the world, at the moment France, Germany, Russia, and China are holding out for more specification about Iraqi sovereignty before they vote a U.N. resolution, which the United States very much wants and needs. And the existing Iraqi Governing Council is also demanding more real power for the post-June 30 government. One member even said that, after June 30, U.S. troops should leave in months, not years.
President Bush has been calling on the American people "to stay the course." General Anthony Zinni, retired Marine general and former commander of U.S. troops in the Middle East, replied incredulously: "This course is headed over Niagara Falls." And so it seems, not merely to longtime opponents of the Iraqi invasion but even to many neo-con supporters of the war. Some of Mr. Bush's own supporters are calling for a "mid-course correction." But what can Bush in fact do? Fareed Zakaria is Newsweek magazine's chief political commentator. He supported the U.S. decision to go into Iraq. In the May 17 issue, his piece is entitled "The Price of Arrogance." His denunciation of President Bush and Secretary Rumsfeld is merciless: "On almost every issue concerning post-war Iraq - troop strength, international support, the credibility of exiles, de-Baathification, handling Ayatollah Ali Sistani - Washington's assumptions and policies have been wrong. By now most have been reversed, often too late to have much effect." Zakaria calls this a "strange combination of arrogance and incompetence" and says that, however the elections turn out, "George W. Bush's legacy is now clear: the creation of a poisonous atmosphere of anti-Americanism around the globe. I'm sure he assumes full responsibility."
The Economist, long the incarnation of worldwide economic conservatism, and also an original supporter of the war, believes that there is indeed a possible mid-course correction that is desperately needed. The May 8-14 issue has a cover that shows one of the infamous photos of Abu Ghraib prison under the heading "Resign, Rumsfeld." Their editorial reads: "The scandal is widening....Moreover, the abuse of these prisoners is not the only damaging error that has been made and it forms part of a culture of extra-legal behaviour that has been set at the highest level....The Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, should resign. And if he won't resign, Mr. Bush should fire him." So, The Economist and Al Gore end up with the same immediate solution to scandal after scandal.
The Economist seems to think this might save Bush. But would it? If Bush thought it would, he might well do it, not out of a sense of honor (much too old-fashioned an idea for born-again Christian Bush) but out of an instinct for political survival. However, it is quite probable that the American people would take a Rumsfeld resignation to be an admission that something was terribly wrong with Administration policies. They might even infer that, as Harry Truman famously said, the "buck" stops not at the door of the of the Secretary of Defense but at the desk of the President of the United States. Bush is not noted for admitting errors. When last asked publicly at a press conference if he could recall any errors he had made at any time during his presidency, he was stumped for an answer, and suggested that the reporter ought to have given advance notice of such a difficult question.
So, the world and Bush are stuck with the scandals that won't go away. Some low-level soldiers will be punished. General Sanchez, who commands the occupation forces, seems to have fallen, although no one will admit that this is the reason. Rumsfeld will stay, at least until the elections. And Bush will have to face his voters and the world - a bit lonely, these days.
Immanuel Wallerstein
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