Commentary No. 26, Oct. 15, 1999
"How to Stay on Top"
The U.S. Senate has voted against ratifying the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.
What is at issue? It's really very simple. Since 1945, the United States has had one unquestioned military advantage on the world scene: its clear superiority in nuclear weapons. There was a short moment in 1949 when it seemed this advantage was seriously challenged by the U.S.S.R., but the U.S. soon pulled ahead again. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, no other nuclear power even comes close to U.S. strength in this arena.
What then is the problem for the United States? Again very simple. While the U.S. has more, stronger, better weapons than anyone else, the weapons that others have or could have are sufficiently powerful to wreak serious damage on the United States.
What then can the United States do about this? There are only two possible courses of action. The U.S. can press forward to have ever stronger weapons (including weapons that would negate the effect of nuclear threats - the so-called nuclear shield). Or the U.S. can try to stop other countries from increasing the strength of their weapons, so as to retain the differential advantage the U.S. currently has.
Of course, the U.S. can try both tactics, and for a long time it has. But the two tactics conflict with each other, and the U.S. has repeatedly been faced with the knowledge that it must choose. Those who choose the path of increasing U.S. nuclear strength have been mostly Republicans and are often called "hawks." Those who choose the path of interdicting the increase in the nuclear capacity of other countries have been mostly Democrats and are often called "doves."
But hawks and doves is entirely the wrong image. Both groups wish to maintain U.S. military superiority. They are merely arguing about the most effective way to do this. If the objective is maintaining U.S. nuclear superiority, a good case can be made for both tactics. The case against the hawk tactic is that other countries will then continue to seek to increase their nuclear capacity and, even if they don't actually catch up with the U.S., they will be ever more capable of wreaking damage on the U.S., and of course on other, more local targets. The opponents to such tactics say it will increase the likelihood of accidents, deliberate local wars, and a possible world conflagration.
The case against the dove tactic is that a test ban treaty is largely unenforceable, and of course there may be countries who won't even sign it. Therefore, it ties the hands of the U.S. military while allowing "rogue" states to pursue their efforts to develop nuclear weaponry.
Both hawks and doves say about each other that the tactic the other proposes will end up by weakening the U.S. in the long run. They are probably both right.
Let us review the history of this controversy. Initially, the U.S. was worried first of all about the Soviet Union, and secondarily about France and China. Of course, as we know, all three countries proceeded to engage in tests and create a nuclear arsenal. In point of fact, nothing much changed as a result thereof. Indeed, in the 1950's, some analysts began to say that what ensured that the "cold war" would not become a hot war was the fact that both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. had a sufficient nuclear arsenal to wreak enormous damage on each other, and therefore neither side wished to start a war. This was called "mutual deterrence."
What led the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. to come to a detente in the 1960's and to sign a Test Ban Treaty was the reality of this stalemate (and therefore the folly of still more tests, which cost money and were toxic to the biosphere), and the wish by both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. to keep further countries not entirely under the control of either side in the cold war (such as India) from developing a nuclear arsenal. Up to a point, this agreement seemed to work.
In the 1980's, the two countries decided to go further along these lines, which is what culminated in the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty under discussion now. But the world had changed. The cold war was over. Hence, the fear of the Soviet Union's nuclear capacity diminished considerably in the U.S. The end of the cold war also meant that the "bipartisan foreign policy" in the U.S., itself a product of the cold war, disappeared and was replaced by an open willingness to submit foreign policy issues to partisan discord and domestic political advantage. At the same time, the end of the cold war ended the ability of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. to constrain politically a large number of countries that were partial or potential nuclear powers - India, Pakistan; Iran, Iraq; China; North Korea. Soon, it will be seen that the possibility may arise in Germany and Japan.
One very interesting consequence of the Senate debate was an Op-Ed piece in the New York Times of Oct. 8, 1999. It was entitled "A Treaty We All Need," and was signed jointly by President Jacques Chirac of France, Prime Minister Tony Blair of Great Britain, and Chancellor Gerhard Schröder of Germany. There are three things to be noticed about this Op-Ed piece. It was probably the first major political declaration of the three leaders jointly. It was a direct intervention in U.S. politics, since it was an appeal to the U.S. Senate to ratify the treaty - an appeal, be it said, that seemed to persuade no one who was not already persuaded. But most significantly of all, it contained a publicly-stated threat. After noting that rejection would remove pressure from other heretofore non-ratifiers (e.g. Russia, China, India, Pakistan) to ratify, and that it would "encourage proliferators" - both standard arguments of proponents of the treaty, the three added that "rejection would also expose a fundamental divergence within NATO."
NATO will not collapse tomorrow just because of this. But the political strains are getting greater daily, in every way. The United States is facing the limits of its power. If it ratifies such a treaty, it fears military decline. If it fails to ratify such a treaty, it may face an equal degree of military decline and a political setback as well.
[Copyright by Immanuel Wallerstein. All rights reserved. Permission is granted to download, forward electronically or e-mail to others and to post this text on non-commercial community Internet sites, provided the essay remains intact and the copyright note is displayed. To translate this text, publish it in printed and/or other forms, including commercial Internet sites and excerpts, contact the author at iwaller@binghamton.edu; fax: 1-607-777-4315.
These commentaries, published twice monthly, are intended to be reflections on the contemporary world scene, as seen
from the perspective not of the immediate headlines but of the long term.]
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