Commentary No. 41, June 1, 2000
"Israel's Future"
Thirty years ago or so, there used to be an Israeli joke which went like this: We don't know which Arab state will be the first to make peace with Israel, but we know the second - Lebanon. It turned out to be very bad analysis. Lebanon will probably be the last. This has to do with the fact that Lebanon is a complicated mosaic of peoples who had erected an even more complicated political arrangement of de facto quotas to keep the peace, except that the peace that was kept for a long time broke down severely more than two decades ago into full-scale civil war. That civil war gave both neighbors, Syria and Israel, an excuse to intervene directly into Lebanese internal affairs, sending in troops and keeping the peace their way.
Syria managed its role quite well, in that it now has effectively a veto power over all major decisions of the Lebanese government, which is not quite a puppet state, but is certainly far less than a vigorously sovereign one. Israel's intervention was far less welcomed and far less effective from Israel's point of view. Israel has for almost two decades occupied a strip of Lebanon along Israel's northern border, and has sustained a truly puppet Lebanese armed group to assist it. In the long run, this turned out to be Israel's Vietnam, costing many lives for objectives that began to seem pointless to the Israeli public. So, Ehud Barak thought he had a clever idea, announcing a year or so ago that Israel intended to withdraw unilaterally from its occupation in Lebanon. Israel hoped that this would aid coming to an agreement with Syria, by removing Syria's ability to use the Israeli occupation as a political bargaining chip. Israel expected the withdrawal to be accompanied by Syrian kudos and a United Nations agreement to send in "peacekeepers."
But the talks with Syria broke down, and Israel was hoist by its own petard. It had to withdraw without any agreement with anyone. This withdrawal was not orderly but swift, leaving its Lebanese allies in the lurch. This permitted the Hezbollah (Shiite Muslims and Israel's harshest enemies in Lebanon) to occupy the area, claim a victory over Israel, and then take the high road by restoring order and making guarantees to other Lebanese communities, thereby establishing themselves as the heralds of Lebanese nationalism. The Syrians may soon regret that they did not take a more active role in the affair.
Meanwhile, Israelis are not clear that they have gotten much out of what they thought would be a noble gesture. Barak has not been doing too well. So far, no kudos in Lebanon, no peace with Syria, and no final agreement with the Palestinians. Will there ever be one? The Israeli-Palestinian struggle has now gone on for 50 years, if not for 100, and both sides are exhausted. They want peace, but they both still think the other side should pay the largest price for it. Since the Israelis have the military strength and the current control of most of the territory, they are in the stronger bargaining position, and they know it. They are ready to make concessions, provided that each time Arafat makes bigger ones.
Will this work? It depends on what we mean by it "working." Arafat is an old man and has clearly decided that he must do whatever it takes (or almost) in order to get a Palestinian state, however truncated, however limited in real power. He will probably accept a fake Jerusalem in the suburb of Abu Dis, and he will continue to allow the eternal postponement of the question of the return of Palestinian refugees. It is possible, though by no means sure, that, within a year, an agreement of this kind can be hammered out. But will it work, in the sense of creating a politically calm situation in the area?
It seems doubtful. The sentiment of Palestinians, especially the refugees, is that they have now tried both major tactics of national liberation - armed struggle and diplomacy. And that neither has brought significant results. They are tired, bitter, unhappy, and for the moment a bit defeatist. But defeatism has the characteristic of not lasting too long. All one needs is a new generation a mere five years from now for the anger to boil up again in a renewed intifada, only this time under the cover of a sovereign Palestinian state, member of the United Nations. This is of course what those Israelis who are against any concessions whatsoever to the Palestinians are predicting. And they may be right. But they are right because a true compromise is not being tried.
In the meantime, there are new generations in Israel as well - some far more genuinely peace-oriented, but some more sectarian than ever. And they have begun major internal battles among themselves, a real Kulturkampf. Anyone who thinks he can foresee how this will play out in 2010 is either a mad genius or a fool. But it doesn't look too good.
[Copyright by Immanuel Wallerstein. All rights reserved. Permission is granted to download, forward electronically or e-mail to others and to post this text on non-commercial community Internet sites, provided the essay remains intact and the copyright note is displayed. To translate this text, publish it in printed and/or other forms, including commercial Internet sites and excerpts, contact the author at iwaller@binghamton.edu; fax: 1-607-777-4315.
These commentaries, published twice monthly, are intended to be reflections on the contemporary world scene, as seen
from the perspective not of the immediate headlines but of the long term.]
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