Commentary No. 50, October 15, 2000
"The Collapse of a Peace Process"
It seems quite clear that the so-called peace process in the Middle East is now over. One can date its either from the Oslo agreements between Israel and the PLO in 1993 or from the Camp David agreements in 1978 between Israel and Egypt. In either case, the present reality is the same. It has always been a shaky process, as are inevitably all such attempts to end fierce and passionate conflicts in which neither side can win a definitive military victory. The hawks on each side always say they don't trust the other side, and now in this case they will say they are vindicated.
The situation in Israel/Palestine is at root quite simple. Two groups who consider themselves "peoples" - the Jews and the Palestinians - laid claim to the same territory, in each case on the basis of long historical connection. Ultimately, the only solution to such a conflict is either a joint state (either unitary or binational) or partition. The former solution having been firmly rejected, the latter has been tried twice, first in 1948 and most recently in 2000. The discussions at Camp David in 2000 reached agreement on what the partition lines should be everywhere except for one small hill in Jerusalem, a hill however replete with symbolic meaning for both sides. Both sides insisted on sovereignty over this hill. It was too small to divide. So one side or the other had to give. Neither was ready to do this.
There is no analytically correct or even just solution to such a debate over a hill. Either one works out a solution both can accept, or one does not. In this case, one didn't. And at that point, the whole process began to disintegrate. The hawks provoked. The doves became indecisive. The killings began, and escalated. And everyone who thought they were in power in the various states - Barak, Arafat, Clinton, Mubarak, Abdullah for a start - saw how little real power they had in such a situation.
Some "peace processes" work. South Africa seemed to work. Some are today somewhere in the middle of the process. They may work - Northern Ireland, Korea, Bosnia. Some haven't even really started - Chechnya/Russia, Chiapas/Mexico. And some break down, more or less definitively. I fear that Israel/Palestine, or Israel/Arab world now joins this lugubrious list. At this moment, everyone seems to be in the middle of deciding who is at fault in the breakdown. I have my views too, but does it matter?
The real question is what happens next. And here we cannot be certain. But there are some likely developments. If the war continues, and we are in a war already, it will probably escalate. It is true that on Oct. 16, there will be a summit in Egypt to seek a truce, and then possibly a resumption of talks. But since both sides have hardened their positions since the failed Camp David discussions, it is hard to see how this will stop the war. At some point soon, the Palestinian Authority will proclaim a Palestinian state. It will be recognized by other Arab states of course, and probably a number of other states in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. It will not be recognized by the United States. The European Union states will be embarrassed, and may divide on this issue.
The Israelis have already made it clear what they would then do. They will either reoccupy any areas of Gaza and the West Bank where they do not still have troops, or (probably less likely) they will simply reoccupy some of these areas, where there are Jewish settlements for example. They will arrest persons linked to the Palestinian Authority, and the various movements. Yasser Arafat may find himself in exile once again. There will be a government of national union in Israel. It is already in the works. And if there is one, the Likud will be calling the shots.
The war may spread beyond the boundaries of Israel/Palestine, though those in power will try to keep this from happening. But can they? In any case, the moderates will be eliminated in both camps, by ouster or by assassination. In the process, Saddam Hussein will be reincorporated fully into the Arab political process. The various Islamist groups (and their counterparts among the Jews in Israel) will be strengthened. The governments of Egypt and Jordan will be in danger. If the war spreads, the possibility that nuclear weapons will be used should not be ruled out.
The war may spread beyond the Middle East. Already there are signs in France, a country that has both Jewish and Arab residents in significant number, that violences could occur there. And if there, why not elsewhere? The power of such passions to enflame persons across the globe is not to be minimized.
The United States? Its authority in the region will be greatly diminished. Those it considers its friends may not survive at all, or if they do, they may become much less friendly. Both Bush and Gore have declared the defense of Israel a U.S. national interest. But what will the U.S. really do? They can and will send money and arms to Israel, and they will support it diplomatically. But it seems virtually impossible that they would send troops. And if they don't send troops, their ability to affect the developments will be small. The U.S. will find itself under attack in many parts of the world, via what is called terrorism. The U.S. will huff and puff, and quite possibly retaliate, but that will be at best only partially effective, and of little use to those who die in the process.
It is possible that mediators will put themselves forward. France and Russia yearn to play this role, which is and will remain unappreciated by both the U.S. and Israel. It seems unlikely that, in the short run, France and Russia can play a big role. Norway is another candidate, but Norway has nothing but moral prestige to offer. And in conflicts of this severity, the value of moral prestige is limited.
So, we are in for a cascading degradation of the situation - countless deaths and cruelties, a dark horizon for everyone in the region, and perhaps beyond. There will of course be enormous negative economic effects - from the physical destruction, from the decline of production and trade, from the increased investment in armaments, from the non-investment of resources. As other areas have discovered in such situations, it takes a long time to pull oneself out of the holes such destructive conflicts engender.
And where will this all end? Who knows? It could be the destruction of the State of Israel. It could be Israeli military occupation not only of Israel but of some neighboring areas. It could be endless guerilla warfare. And perhaps twenty years down the line, exhaustion will set in, and there will be some continuing truce again.
The basic issue is that Israel cannot survive without some acceptance as a legitimate state by its neighbors. Its entire foreign policy for the past thirty years has centered around achieving this. The breakdown of the peace process is also the breakdown of this kind of legitimation. Whether it can be reinitiated in the future is uncertain.
Immanuel Wallerstein
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