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Commentary No. 58, Feb. 15, 2001

"The CIA's Assessment of World Perils"

George J. Tenet, Director of Central Intelligence testified publicly before the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on Feb. 7. His statement is available to anyone on the CIA's web site. It is entitled "Worldwide Threat 2001: National Security in a Changing World." It paints a very bleak picture of world geopolitics, in terms of what Mr. Tenet considers are U.S. interests in the world-system. It is always a bit difficult to be sure, when reading such a public statement, how much of it is overstatement for immediate internal political gain (more funds, inflation of the role of the CIA, etc.) and how much is a call of alarm to alert political figures, especially in the U.S. Congress.

But it is always prudent to take such statements seriously, and to analyze them. The basic theme is that things are getting worse. Tenet calls this an "accelerating rate of change." He sees the current situation as the most difficult the U.S. has had to deal with (since 1945? it is not clear). He says: "Never have we had to deal with such a high quotient of uncertainty." Uncertainty is the theme over and over.

For example, the threat of "terrorism" - an old theme. But now, says Tenet, whereas "state-sponsored terrorism" is declining, decentralized transnational groups are emerging, and acts are "initiated and executed at lower levels." Ergo, as we can readily infer, it is far more difficult to put pressure on those responsible or make deals with them.

Weapon proliferation - nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons - seems to be the biggest worry. Tenet reviews the usual culprits, but then goes on to the higher worry. Three countries are singled out - Russia, China, and North Korea - not merely for possessing and expanding their own capacities but for being suppliers to other countries of these weapons. Tenet keeps repeating that these other countries need foreign assistance to enhance their own capacity, and that they are in fact getting precisely that, foreign assistance.

The U.S. in general, and the U.S. military in particular, are especially proud of their advantage in information technology. Tenet points out that the flip side of this advantage is the increase in vulnerability. Other countries do not need to match U.S. military technology because, by attacking U.S. informational nets, they have "the potential to degrade and circumvent [U.S.] advantage in conventional military power." And as we all know it seems quite easy for hackers, who seem to be a large group, to do damage to information networks.

When Tenet gets to regional issues, he puts, not surprisingly, the Middle East at the top of his list of worries. But again, let us notice what he worries about - not Arafat or Assad or even Saddam Hussein. He worries about "the changing nature of activism of the Arab street," and says that "a restive public is increasingly capable of taking action without any identifiable leadership or organizational structure." Once again, no one with whom the U.S. can make a deal, no one to intimidate. A faceless mob - the "energized street" - this is the ultimate nightmare of defenders of the status quo.

As Tenet goes through the zones of worry - North Korea, China, Russia, Central Asia, Iran, Iraq, the Balkans, South Asia, Indonesia, Africa, Colombia - what is striking is the universally somber tone. In no region does he say things are looking up. Danger, danger everywhere. He ends bemoaning the growth in "potential for state fragmentation." Once again, the worry is a chaotic situation that is not amenable to the usual kind of pressures a superpower exercises.

I would say myself that Tenet's assessment is rather realistic, and much more than the blather we have been getting from the rest of the Bush administration. The United States is indeed facing a different kind of threat today than it did during the period of the Cold War. There is no super-enemy, who coordinates the other side, and with whom one can deal, whether by mutual threat or by detente. And the U.S. is not at all psychologically prepared to deal with the "street" amidst "state fragmentation" and "uncertainty." Thus far, it has been reacting with the old methods against an enemy who is no longer there. It is Maginot Line mentality.

But more things have to collapse before the present U.S. leaders are ready to listen to someone like Tenet. And it is not at all clear that Tenet knows what to do in this new situation. But at least he knows there is one.
 

Immanuel Wallerstein

[Copyright by Immanuel Wallerstein. All rights reserved. Permission is granted to download, forward electronically or e-mail to others and to post this text on non-commercial community Internet sites, provided the essay remains intact and the copyright note is displayed. To translate this text, publish it in printed and/or other forms, including commercial Internet sites and excerpts, contact the author at iwaller@binghamton.edu; fax: 1-607-777-4315.

These commentaries, published twice monthly, are intended to be reflections on the contemporary world scene, as seen from the perspective not of the immediate headlines but of the long term.]

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