When Vladimir Putin became President of Russia, not so long ago, he had relatively few cards with which to play in the world arena. The Russian economy was in bad shape, and large segments of the population were worse off than they had been in the last years of the Soviet regime. The central government was in bad shape, threatened both by local and regional barons who had usurped a large part of real political power and by a very persistent secessionist movement in Chechnya. The armed forces were very unhappy, remembering how much relative power they had lost in the world arena and not seeing too many prospects of immediate improvement in their lot. Rather they were being bled and made unpopular by the unsuccessful war in Chechnya.

The world financial institutions were tired of funding the drain in the Russian economy. The United States was largely ignoring Russia politically, proceeding with an expansion of NATO into countries bordering Russia. Western Europe was annoyed by Russia's position on Yugoslavia and disabused of economic investments there. The Chinese seemed to have written Russia off. Russia's credit in the Middle East, and beyond in other parts of the Third World, was at an all-time low. And of course, the ex-satellites in east/central Europe were doing everything they could think of to make life miserable for the Russians.

It's a wonder Putin took the job. It didn't seem very promising. How things have changed in under two years. Putin has been a very energetic leader, a much cleverer one than anyone gave him credit for (after all, he was supposed to be nothing but a KGB apparatchik), and quite tactful in his diplomacy.

He started with first things first, firming up his base at home. He liquidated the barons and recentralized the state. And he took firm action against the Chechens, without losing too many Russian lives. He hasn't won that war. Far from it! And he has had to take a lot of international flak for violating human rights. But, unlike the bumbler Yeltsin, he managed to make the pursuit of the war against the Chechens less a source of popular grumbling than a source of Russian popular pride in his "strong" leadership. The army seems to be reassured that he will do what he can, within the limits of a strained budget, to meet their needs.

Putin then began to pursue a foreign policy in all directions (tous azimuts, as de Gaulle said in 1968 of French nuclear strategy). He went to China, and between them they set up a quiet alliance on two issues - countering Islamism in Central Asia, and trying to limit U.S. power in the world. He went to Germany, and charmed the Bundestag not only by speaking in German but by seeming to be quite a reasonable fellow. He reinvigorated Russian ties with Iran, but was also diplomatically helpful to Iraq. He even managed to get the Prime Minister of Israel to visit Russia.

With a bit of patience, he persuaded George W. Bush to meet with him - in Slovenia. And Bush looked Putin in the eye and announced to the world that he could trust him. That one-upped Gorbachev who only managed to get Reagan to say "trust, but verify."

He improved relations with the IMF and World Bank, and presided over an upturn in the Russian oil industry, which now provides 40% of an expanded government revenue.

So, when September 11 came along, Putin was ready to take maximum advantage of the fast-moving game of world chess that was going on. He did this by being flexible without giving up very much. The U.S. wanted support for the war on terrorism. It got it. The U.S. wanted to make some military arrangements with Uzbekistan and Tadjikistan. Russia did not oppose it but did not relax its own strong position in Tadjikistan.

The United States was happy to pay for this cooperation. One of the major issues between the U.S. and Russia was Bush's determination to move forward with missile defense and, if necessary, to renounce the arms treaty with Russia that stood in his way. So Putin went to Texas, put on cowboy boots, and got the Bush administration to postpone, for the moment at least. any idea of renouncing the treaty, without actually endorsing anything the Bush administration wants in changes to the treaty. They are still "discussing" this. In the meantime, U.S. criticism of Russia's actions in Chechnya has dissolved in the wake of Bush's zero tolerance for terrorists. Putin was all smiles. When Andrei Gromyko nominated Mihail Gorbachev as First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, he is supposed to have said to the Politburo, Comrade Gorbachev "has teeth of steel." I will leave it to history to decide if this evaluation was accurate in the case of Gorbachev, but I have the feeling that Putin has teeth of steel.

Meanwhile, Putin discussed with NATO some new arrangements. He saw he couldn't stop expansion. So he decided, in the old political wisdom - if you can't beat 'em, join 'em. NATO and Russia are moving forward with the creation of a special NATO-Russia council, to cover such joint concerns as "terrorism" and other matters, not publicly disclosed or perhaps not yet decided. The press is speculating as to whether this does or does not give Russia the same kind of veto power every NATO member has on joint action. But at the very least it gives Russia a say in NATO matters. And as far as I can see Russia has not had to pay a price for this privilege. It is said that some countries in east/central Europe are not very happy about this new arrangement.

And finally, and not least, for the first time in my memory, Russia is at the center of discussions of the world price of oil. Raising or lowering the price of oil, by fiat or by adjusting the output, has long been the purview of OPEC, and most especially of Saudi Arabia. Who actually pulls the strings has long been a matter of debate, but there seems to be little doubt that raising or lowering the oil price has serious consequences for the world-economy.

In November of 2001, the price of oil plunged on the world market. And the Saudis took the lead in calling for a reduction of world output in order to bolster the price level. OPEC agreed. Non-members Mexico, Norway, and the U.K. went along. Russia refused. And since Russia refused, it isn't going to happen, at least not now.

So why did Russia do this? Putin says he has nothing to do with it. It is the decision of those privatized oil firms that now control Russian oil production. It is amusing to see how fast Putin has cottoned on to the favorite trick of U.S. presidents - denying any responsibility for what U.S. private corporations do, when everyone knows that, if the U.S. government really wants to twist the arms of these corporations, it can and will do so. (Most recently, it twisted the arms of all the private television networks not to show interviews with Osama bin Laden.)

So why would Putin not want to go along? One can suggest several reasons. One is simply that Russia thinks the demand is outrageous. In the 1990s, Russia reduced its output because of the economic confusion and turmoil, and the Saudis and others reaped the benefits of that. Now that Russia is doing better (and making up for lost income), the Saudis want them to pull in their belt. A second reason is that Russia's economy and government income is now doing better precisely because of oil production, and they don't want to hurt that. A third reason may be that Russia is aiming for the long run, of increasing its market share, for which it is prepared to take lower prices now.

But there are also geopolitical considerations. The Saudis are in political trouble at home. And this trouble is causing them to fail to meet immediate U.S. demands, thereby straining the alliance. Russia may want to show the U.S. that it is more reliable than the Saudis, may want to begin to appear as a possible substitute for them in terms of energy production. In any case, Putin's position on this matter is not displeasing to the U.S. Treasury at this moment.
 

Meanwhile, there are Russians in Kabul again, thanks to their proxy, the Northern Alliance, and its agent, the U.S. Air Force. All this doesn't make Russia a superpower again. But it does return Russia to the role of a very serious player on the world geopolitical scene.

Immanuel Wallerstein
[Copyright by Immanuel Wallerstein. All rights reserved. Permission is granted to download, forward electronically or e-mail to others and to post this text on non-commercial community Internet sites, provided the essay remains intact and the copyright note is displayed. To translate this text, publish it in printed and/or other forms, including commercial Internet sites and excerpts, contact the author at iwaller@binghamton.edu; fax: 1-607-777-4315.

These commentaries, published twice monthly, are intended to be reflections on the contemporary world scene, as seen from the perspective not of the immediate headlines but of the long term.]

 
 

Email this Commentary to a colleague

______________________________________________

Go to List of Commentaries

Go to Fernand Braudel Center Homepage