Commentary No. 84, Mar. 1, 2002

"Why NATO?"  

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was created on April 4, 1949, joining together twelve "North Atlantic" countries. It was in the immediate sense a response to the Berlin blockade which the U.S.S.R. had instituted on June 24, 1948. It was more broadly the central Western military structure during the Cold War. One might therefore have thought that, with the end of the Cold War, NATO would have been dissolved. But far from it. NATO not only continued to exist, but it has taken in new members, countries that were formerly part of the Warsaw Pact, which was the prime antagonist of NATO during the Cold War.

So we need to ask why? What purpose does NATO serve? What is it intended to do? The answer depends upon whom you ask. There are four major actors in the continuation of NATO as a structure: the United States, the other states that were members during the Cold War (15 by 1952), the new members and prospective members in east and central Europe, and Russia. Each of the four has a different perspective, and a different set of motivations.

Let us start with the Western European states. When NATO was founded, they saw it as military protection from what they considered to be a potential military threat from the Soviet Union. They saw it as a way to ensure that U.S. troops would be stationed in Europe and that the U.S. would be committed to join them immediately in using their military in case of an attack, or even of a military measure like the Berlin blockade. To be sure, there were persons and movements in all these countries who were hostile to, or at least unenthusiastic about, NATO: Communist parties, pacifist movements, and some others. But one can say that the clear majority of the populations in these countries strongly supported the NATO treaty.

There were some complaints. The governments of those countries with colonial possessions felt that NATO should be extended to cover their colonial territories. But the United States categorically refused, not wishing to commit its military power or even its political support to the struggle of European states with national liberation movements. NATO was defined as strictly limited to European/North Atlantic area conflicts. During all this time, the U.S. insisted on having a U.S. military officer as commander-in-chief of the NATO forces, and this seemed acceptable to west Europeans, as both reasonable and as a guarantee that the U.S. would remain committed to the treaty.

As western Europe became stronger economically and politically, and began to construct the European Union, the idea of a European army began to be seriously discussed. France and Germany committed themselves in 1987 to this objective. The United States was distinctly cool on the whole idea. While it did not voice absolute public opposition, it did whatever it could to slow down and/or sabotage the idea. And it certainly insisted loudly that any West European force should somehow be "integrated" into NATO. With however the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and then of the Soviet Union itself in 1991, efforts to construct a European army began to take off.

The U.S. position engaged in two measures designed primarily to make sure that no independent European army would come into existence. One was to invent a role for a European force within NATO: the Europeans were to be the "peacekeeping" force, once presumably the war had been won (by the United States, primarily). This concept would be implemented in Bosnia, in Kosovo, and now to some extent in Afghanistan. The Europeans were thus to have the dirty, unpleasant, but in the long run not that important, task of "clean-up" which the U.S. found politically unpalatable in terms of its own public opinion.

And NATO would be "expanded." Why was this important? Against whom was the alliance arming now? The inclusion of East/Central European states in NATO (already the case with three of them and in process for many others) was designed to achieve two things. It was to make far more difficult, if not impossible, any politico/military alignment of the West Europeans with Russia. This is the principal geopolitical nightmare of the U.S. It is more immediate than the other nightmare, the growing military might of China.

Secondly, it was to make West European politico-cultural unity more difficult by intruding reliably pro-American elements from East/Central Europe into the decision-making structures of the European Union. Once NATO expanded, the European Union was pressured to "expand" immediately also, and in the same way more or less. Such expansion would not only complicate enormously Europe's ability to construct a strong political center, but would weaken it economically, by committing west European (not U.S.) resources to the improvement of economic conditions in east/central Europe.

The east/central Europeans of course have been delighted to play the role assigned to them. They do want to be part of "Europe" and to be accepted as the cultural equals of the West Europeans. But they want even more to be part of the American world, and to be linked in whatever way they can be to the U.S., seen both as earthly paradise, and an anti-Russia. The last thing they want is the inclusion of Russia into any European structure.

The Russians of course see all this clearly. First, they tried to stop NATO expansion by threats. But the threats were bluster, and impressed no one, least of all the United States. So they have now decided to sneak in the back door, estimating that they could better control the situation from within NATO. A new special arrangement (know colloquially as 19 + 1) is about to be ratified, which makes Russia a semi-member of NATO.

There are two questions about what has been happening? Why have the west Europeans allowed this to happen? And what does the U.S. really want? The first question is harder to answer than the second. There are several elements to the answer about the west Europeans. There is still a large older generation (who of course are heavily represented in the higher political councils) who remain "grateful" to the U.S. and feel they should pay the price of gratitude. And there are some who agree that western Europe should stand by the U.S. politically against the demands of the uncivilized peoples.

But perhaps more important is the fact that the Europeans, quite apart from these immediate geopolitical considerations, are unsure how far and how fast they wish to proceed with political unification. And therefore, they are also unsure how far and how fast they wish to pull Russia into their house. Were Europe to assert itself as a relatively unified political and economic force on the world stage, it would of course need Russia, both for its potential addition to Europe's military force and as a key element in the European internal market.

As for the U.S., the curious thing, after all of this, is that the U.S. needs and wants NATO least of all. They want NATO primarily to keep western Europe from detaching itself from U.S. influence/control. But they do not want NATO militarily. The U.S. reaction after Sept. 11 made this preeminently clear. On Sept. 13, Lord Robertson, on behalf of NATO, offered full military help under Article 5 of the treaty, an article never before invoked. The offer was quietly declined. The U.S. sees NATO as a military drag. In Kosovo, a battle that was fought under the NATO banner, the U.S. military had to clear military decisions with other NATO members. This was a constraint the U.S. did not appreciate and is not about to allow to be repeated. The U.S. is supremely confident that it does not need NATO and can handle the world military situation on its own. Europeans should stick to logistical support and peacekeeping, as requested by the U.S.

The curious thing these days is that it is the U.S. that is doing most to undermine the solidity, perhaps the very existence, of NATO.

Immanuel Wallerstein

[Copyright by Immanuel Wallerstein. All rights reserved. Permission is granted to download, forward electronically or e-mail to others and to post this text on non-commercial community Internet sites, provided the essay remains intact and the copyright note is displayed. To translate this text, publish it in printed and/or other forms, including commercial Internet sites and excerpts, contact the author at iwaller@binghamton.edu; fax: 1-607-777-4315.

These commentaries, published twice monthly, are intended to be reflections on the contemporary world scene, as seen from the perspective not of the immediate headlines but of the long term.]

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