Commentary No. 91, June 15, 2002
"Prerequisites, Power, and Peace"
Politics is about the struggles over alternative public policies. Such struggles are endless. In the contemporary world, it is considered desirable that these struggles be decided by some kind of voting process in which the majority rules. We all know that individuals and groups have views on such policies of varying strength, and that the determination with which individuals or groups pursue their objectives (which includes how much money, prestige, and favors they will invest in pursuing their objectives) affects the results enormously. What we call a stable, relatively democratic state is one in which these debates and disputes are conducted without open violence.
We also all know that there are many such debates and disputes which arouse a higher degree of passion because they seem to be about the fundamental rules of the game: who is included in the decision-making processes, what are the boundary lines within which policies are set, who owns the land and the heritage of a particular area. Let us call these constitutional struggles. These struggles occur in many different contexts. They may involve a colony seeking its independence from a colonizing power. They may involve a "minority" (who are sometimes the majority of the population) seeking to overcome exclusion from political (but also economic and social) rights within the state. They may involve a long-standing land/boundary dispute between states.
Let us take a small list of such disputes that have gotten considerable worldwide publicity in the last few decades: India/
Pakistan over Kashmir, South Africa under the apartheid regime, Northern Ireland, Chechnya, Israel/Palestine, Chiapas/Mexico, the Southern Sudan, the Kurds in Turkey, the Basques in Spain, East Timor/Indonesia, Kosovo/Serbia. The quite diverse conflicts on this list in fact share two characteristics: (1) at some point, there has been violence; (2) in each case, one side is essentially defending a status quo while the other side is asking for a considerable change in the situation.
Of course, the situations are indeed quite different, and I have chosen the list to make clear that, in terms of ideology or outside support, the "weaker" and the "stronger" sides of these conflicts do not attract consistent worldwide solidarities. People who supported Kosovo may not have supported the Basques. People who supported the Southern Sudanese may not have supported the Palestinians. Of course, these people do not think of themselves as being inconsistent. They will argue the specifics of each situation, and say that they are not morally equivalent.
I should like to locate however some further commonalities by looking at the history of the rhetoric in these situations. The grievances that underlie these disputes often have roots in events or deeds that occurred in a distant past. A group was conquered, or displaced, or had its land confiscated. This happened because this group was weaker than the group which conquered it, displaced it, or confiscated its land. Furthermore, the grievances often involve the fact that these past deeds led to the creation of political structures that effectively disenfranchised the weaker group or sought to abolish them culturally (by religious conversion or by linguistic imposition).
The history of the rhetoric has usually been as follows. Stage one: the stronger group validates the structure by arguments about the merits of the stronger group and the cultural limitations of the weaker group. Stage two: the weaker group organizes politically, contesting the rhetoric and demanding a more "egalitarian" structure. Stage three: the stronger group ignores the weaker group, and the weaker group gets nowhere in terms of constitutional change. Stage four: some elements of the weaker group begin to engage in violent acts; the world takes notice.
When we get to stage four, part of the politics becomes obtaining or retaining the support of powerful outside groups. So the stronger group argues that the violence of the weaker group is illegitimate, and that making concessions to violence sets an unacceptable precedent. The stronger group demands the end of violence as a "prerequisite" to discussions that could lead to "peace." The weaker group responds that, without violence, they were ignored. And that it is only discussions that lead to a "political" solution which will allow the violence to end. Impasse!
We all recognize stage four. It is the Indian government demanding that Pakistan hold back the infiltrators. It is the apartheid regime refusing to release Nelson Mandela from prison until ANC renounces violence. It is the Northern Irish Protestants demanding that IRA disarm before matters can proceed. It is the Russian government insisting that the Chechnya rebels are criminals. It is Sharon saying that there will be no discussion with the Palestinian Authority until all terrorism ceases. It is the Mexican government insisting that its troops must occupy Chiapas in order to restore order before discussions can continue. It is the Khartoum government saying that the southern Sudanese must lay down their arms, and the Turkish government saying the same thing to the Kurds. It is the Spanish government denouncing the ETA terrorists. It is the Indonesian government responding to the East Timorese with ferocious repression. It is the Serbians sending in their troops to wipe out Kosovo rebels.
Once again, I choose all these cases because I believe the readers are likely to agree with the "stronger" group only in some cases and will disagree strongly in others. I do myself. But the structural parallels among all these cases are still striking. What is also striking is the debate within each camp, which seems to be the same in all of them. Each side has "moderates" who wish to find a political solution, one that involves some "compromise." And each side has intransigents who want all or nothing, and who spend most of their energy fighting the moderates on their own side, or trying to undermine any negotiations by the timely use of provocative violence.
These nine cases are indeed different, each one from the other. And solutions, if solutions there be, must vary. But they are all about power and rights. And they all include violence, the violence of those who wish the status quo to be maintained and the violence of those who wish to transform it. And they all end only when there is a political agreement. If the "war against terrorism" is a war to stop the weaker groups from using violence, it is Don Quixote tilting at windmills. Of course, enough strength in defense of the status quo may repress successfully for a while. But it is always only for a while. And of course, the organizations of rebellion in a particular case may be destroyed. But if they are, they are usually replaced by others - more moderate, if political concessions are in fact made, more ferocious if they are not.
What we all need to realize is that the end of such disputes - stage five in which it is largely a historical anecdote (such as today the Franco-German struggle over Alsace-Lorraine) - has always been brought about politically, not militarily. There is of course here a political lesson for both sides. But the political solution also always involves the use of violence by both sides. In any important issue, it is virtually unavoidable.
Less moralizing and more hard-nosed political analysis might help. Concessions are always painful. The important thing is that when the concessions are made, they should be such that the pain is only felt by current generations and the fact that they were painful will later seem incomprehensible to the generations yet unborn. These kinds of political solution are the only lasting ones.
Immanuel Wallerstein
[Copyright by Immanuel Wallerstein. All rights reserved. Permission is granted to download, forward electronically or e-mail to others and to post this text on non-commercial community Internet sites, provided the essay remains intact and the copyright note is displayed. To translate this text, publish it in printed and/or other forms, including commercial Internet sites and excerpts, contact the author at iwaller@binghamton.edu; fax: 1-607-777-4315.
These commentaries, published twice monthly, are intended to be reflections on the contemporary world scene, as seen
from the perspective not of the immediate headlines but of the long term.]
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