Commentary No. 92, July 1, 2002
"Preemption: The Political and Moral Stakes"
War remains a reality of the world. Nonetheless, for five centuries at least, states within the modern world-system have been struggling to create "rules of war" that would somehow limit, even eliminate, the most brutal, least justified, modes of engaging in warfare. These rules have been increasingly codified in international treaties.
In 1945, the United Nations Charter made a distinction between starting wars and defending one's country against wars that others started. The Charter accepts the legitimacy of "self-defense" and even of "collective self-defense" - that is, agreements between countries that if one is attacked, the others would rise to its defense. While in practice these rules have often been violated, it is the tribute of vice to virtue that violators since 1945 have hypocritically denied that they were violators. They have insisted that they did not start wars but that the other side did. For example, North Korea has always denied that it started a war with South Korea in 1950, arguing that it was South Korea that initiated hostilities. When the United States invaded Grenada in 1983, it asserted that it was doing this only because the lives of U.S. medical students were endangered, and therefore Grenada was the first to be hostile.
During the long cold war between the United States and the Soviet Union, there was said to be a "balance of terror." This meant that both sides knew that, if the other started a war by using nuclear weapons, the other side was in a position to respond effectively, and that therefore the principal result would be mutual destruction. Nonetheless, there was constant discussion within the U.S. government (and perhaps within the Soviet government as well) of whether or not it was possible and desirable to launch such a war with so much surprise that the other side would be unable to respond effectively. This was called the issue of a "first strike" which would be "preemptive." This obviously never occurred. We cannot be sure whether the decisions were made primarily on technical grounds (the surprise would never be sufficient to avoid devastating response) or on political/moral grounds (a first strike would violate the U.N. Charter). What can be said is that no U.S. administration ever definitively repudiated the possibility of a first strike. Many persons believed that this merely was in order to keep the other side on its toes and not because any of them intended ever to carry one out.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, it was argued that there was less need to worry about a "first strike" since the cold war was over. But since Sept. 11, the subject has been revived. In his West Point speech in June, 2002, Pres. George W. Bush said: "If we wait for threats to fully materialize, we will have waited too long." This is fairly clear language. It says a first strike is legitimate, especially since Condoleeza Rice elaborated on the speech by saying "It means forestalling certain destructive acts against you by an adversary."
Bob Woodward revealed, in the Washington Post of June 16, 2002, that the Bush administration has recently discussed the possible use of U.S. teams to assassinate Saddam Hussein. The U.S. had engaged in assassination attempts in the 1950s and 1960s - none successfully, as far as we know. As a result of the revelation of this policy by the Church Committee of the U.S. Senate in 1973, Pres. Ford issued an executive order in 1976 banning the practice. This order was maintained by subsequent U.S. presidents, included Reagan and Bush (father). It is this order that is now being repealed.
In the latest issue of the International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence (XV, 2, 2002), Jeffrey T. Richelson makes an open case for "assassination as a national security option." It is worth reviewing his arguments: "No convincing case can be that the ban [on assassinations] should be made absolute....Arguing that the U.S. should continue its ban in its present form would be more reasonable. Under the standing U.S. interpretation of international law, targeted killings of enemy leaders are permitted in just those situations where they are most likely to be indicated - in the midst of war, during a continuing series of terrorist attacks, or in the face of imminent attack. Thus, the ban did not stop President George W. Bush from signing a presidential finding in October 2001 that authorized the killing of Osama bin Laden."
So the plan seems clear. First, the U.S. tries assassination of Saddam Hussein. If that doesn't work (and it seems a bit unlikely that it will), then a preemptive first strike. President Bush has been quite ready to indicate that he wishes "regime change" in various countries. To say that this is a violation of sovereignty is to say the obvious. But that doesn't seem to faze him, since he is speaking the language of power, not of law. He is coating this language of power in the language of morality: the struggle against terrorism and for democracy. I shall not here discuss the political efficacy of such a policy. I have done that elsewhere, and its political efficacy is precisely the subject of debate within the U.S. administration, the U.S. Congress, and the various leaders of the European Union.
But this is not only a question of politics, but of law and of morality, and these two issues seem to be getting less debate. It seems clear to simple people (I am a simple person) that "forestalling" is not "defense" for one simple reason: the only way the law recognizes defense is after an act occurs. Intent to engage in an act does not constitute an act, since one never knows if the intent will be carried through. In addition, the forestaller is interpreting this intent, and he can (and quite often does) interpret it incorrectly. In criminal law, I am not legally authorized to shoot someone because I have heard him say nasty things about me and think that one day soon he may try to shoot me. If however, this other person points a gun at me, I may shoot him in self-defense. Without this elementary distinction, we are in a lawless world.
Then there is morality. Morality is dependent on the reasonableness of our actions. And reasonableness requires taking into account the degree to which we ourselves might be mistaken. There seems to be little indication that anyone in the U.S. administration is worrying about the fact that we might possibly be mistaken. But such worry, such self-analysis is crucial to morality. A preemptive war is an irrevocable action. It is not a minor misdemeanor which can be rectified by say financial compensation. People die, and in most cases many people die. The preemptor may say he wishes to prevent others (his friends and family, his co-nationals) from dying in the expected aggression of the other. The fact will nonetheless be that the preemptor shoots first and kills first. If this is not covered by the commandment, "thou shalt not kill," what is?
So it seems to me absurdly simple. First strikes are against international law. First strikes are immoral. If it is a political error, we may survive that. An error in law (of this magnitude) undermines the very possibility of law. And an error in morality (some call it a sin) is one that transforms us, not visibly for the better.
Immanuel Wallerstein
[Copyright by Immanuel Wallerstein. All rights reserved. Permission is granted to download, forward electronically or e-mail to others and to post this text on non-commercial community Internet sites, provided the essay remains intact and the copyright note is displayed. To translate this text, publish it in printed and/or other forms, including commercial Internet sites and excerpts, contact the author at iwaller@binghamton.edu; fax: 1-607-777-4315.
These commentaries, published twice monthly, are intended to be reflections on the contemporary world scene, as seen
from the perspective not of the immediate headlines but of the long term.]
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