Commentary No. 97, September 15, 2002
"9/11, One Year Later"
Everyone knows today to what the symbol 9/11 refers. It refers to the day on which a group of followers of Osama bin Laden seized control of four airplanes in the United States, and managed to destroy the Twin Towers in New York and damage the Pentagon outside Washington. Several thousand persons lost their lives. As a result, President Bush declared a "war on terrorism," which, he said, "we will certainly win." He called on everyone everywhere to support the U.S. in this war, and said that those who were not with us were against us. He promised to capture Osama bin Laden, "dead or alive."
The immediate reaction of the American people to the attack was one of very large-scale support for President Bush and what he proposed to do. In addition, there was a wave of worldwide sympathy for America under attack. To the astonishment of more than one person, the editorial in Le Monde the next day was entitled "We are all Americans now." Bush's initial mode of implementing his program was twofold: Internationally, Bush sought to create a wide coalition of anti-terrorist activities, including the sending of troops to Afghanistan to overthrow the Taliban regime and to destroy Al-Qaeda, thought to be located in large part within Afghanistan. Internally, he sought to improve considerably measures of security, most notably by the passage of the Patriot Act, which gave unprecedented powers to the U.S. government in overcoming legal obstacles to its activities. This Act passed the U.S. Congress almost unanimously.
The initial success of the Bush policies seemed therefore considerable. The United States seemed to hold the high ground in world public opinion. The Taliban were removed militarily from power without too much difficulty. And although neither bin Laden nor most of the Al-Qaeda leadership were captured, they seemed to be "on the run." Then the situation began to change. First of all, the United States shifted the locus of its attention. The pursuit of bin Laden and al-Qaeda seemed to fade into the background to be replaced by a different objective, "regime change" in Iraq. This objective did not at all get the worldwide assent that the "war on terrorism" evoked. Quite the contrary. So many voices seemed to rise up in protest against "preemptive action" that the United States government is now working full time to make sure that it is not totally isolated on this issue. Le Monde ran a second editorial one year later, in which it said: "The reflex of solidarity of one year ago has been transformed into a wave that might lead one to believe that, across the world, we have all become anti-Americans." The Chancellor of Germany, a country only a year ago still thought to be an indefatigable ally of the United States, is gaining in public opinion in a close electoral battle precisely because he has asserted that Germany will not send troops to invade Iraq, even if the Security Council authorizes it.
What happened during this year? The answer depends on to whom you pose the question. Let us start with those who are called the hawks in the U.S. administration, and who now seem to call the tune. They will say that they have cut through the wishy-washy kind of support upon which the U.S. has long relied, and are asserting - for the first time in over 50 years - the only kind of policy that will guarantee the national interests of the United States. They believe that the U.S. not only has the right to engage in preemptive action but the moral duty to do so. They know it discomforts many people and many governments. But they believe, as Secretary Rumsfeld said last week, that if the United States decides something is right to do and then does it, others will see that it was right and will eventually support it. Unilateralism, for the hawks, is neither wrong nor imprudent; on the contrary, it is the path of wisdom.
Which others is Rumsfeld talking about? He is talking about all those who, claiming to share U.S. values, hesitate at the image of unilateralism and urge a return to "multilateralism": in the United States, Republican stalwarts like James Baker, the Clintonites; elsewhere all those in Canada and western Europe, who are the traditional allies of the United States; the so-called moderates in the Islamic world. Rumsfeld feels their objections are all puff and when the dragon emits his flames, they will all crumble. Is Rumsfeld right about how they will act when they are largely ignored? We shall see, although he is probably right in part. Some of them are already crumbling, and are merely asking for a facade of consultation so that they may then assent.
If you ask the moderates in the Islamic world, they seem to be shaking their heads over the madness of the hawks. They live daily in touch with their local reality. They know the limits of their own power. They know also, better than the United States, the limits of U.S. power in their region. For them, it is a bit like Samson pulling down the temple. They are under the roof and will be crushed as well. But they also know their voices amount to little in Washington today. No doubt, many of them are putting their personal fates in the hands of Allah and perhaps some Swiss bankers as well.
If you ask bin Laden what has been happening, he would probably say, were he able to talk the cynical language of the geopoliticians, that all is going according to plan. (I have explained all this in the previous commentary, No. 96.) President Bush says that the U.S. objective is to strengthen the prospects of democracy in the Middle East. But that dedicated minority of persons who truly have this as an objective are wringing their hands in desperation. They know that no viable democratic regimes are going to emerge from this next explosion in the Middle East. They can only expect fanatic Islamists and repressive generals, eliminating the few pockets of space these persons now have. Torture, not liberty, awaits them.
Saddam Hussein is a nasty fellow. But he has been that for a long, long time, and for most of this time had the strong support of the United States, Soviet/Russian, and French governments. He is, when all is said and done, a very minor figure on the world scene, and furthermore historically a rather prudent figure. His primary goal is to remain in power. His secondary goal is to strengthen the Arab world militarily, with him as the leader - and this is exactly what has made him prudent.
The dangers the coming Iraqi war pose for all of us are threefold: (1) It may go far towards creating Huntington's "clash of civilizations," transforming it from a rhetorical misapprehension of reality into an organizing principle. (2) It will probably lead to the use of nuclear weapons, thereby ending the taboo, and making their use commonplace in the future. (3) It will legitimate "preemptive action," something the interstate system has been trying to outlaw for some 500 years. And on top of all of this, there will be no clearcut outcome, no immediate end in sight. We live in a chaotic world. But we don't have to up the ante so radically. Unfortunately, we are going to.
Immanuel Wallerstein
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