Fernand Braudel Center, Binghamton University
©Immanuel Wallerstein (iwaller @binghamton.edu)
1. You have consistently downplayed the chances of US military victory in Iraq. In your Commentary of 1 September 2002, you suggested that the likelihood of a speedy US victory with minimal loss of life is around one chance in twenty (while the probabilities of a prolonged war with heavy US casualties resulting in eventual US victory or even defeat were 2 in 3 and 1 in 3, respectively). What was the basis of your assessment, and would you still stand by your prognosis today?
A: Yes, I stick by my estimates. Prognoses of this kind depend on two assessments, that of the military situation and that of the political. Obviously I am no military expert, nor do I have any real access to the military realities. Nonetheless, I have observed that a long series of retired top-level military officers from the United States, Great Britain, and Australia have all indicated their skepticism, as military persons, about the optimistic prognoses of the Pentagon. And there are many indications that high-ranking serving officers agree with them.
I answer your question on Day 5 of the war. The press is beginning to take note of greater military difficulties than had been expected, and President Bush expressed his expectations yesterday with considerably more reserve than previously. The Pentagon let it be known that it expected to win outright within 3-10 days. We have five days to go, and it doesn't look too good. Every day after 10 days puts us fuller into scenario two. After six weeks, there will be no doubt in anyone's mind.
Then there are the political elements. There is an Iraqi nationalist reflex. The Guardian today has a story in which an Iraqi explains why the bombings have turned him into a supporter of Saddam Hussein. I'll bet he's not the only one, especially if the resistance gets fierce. In addition, there are the uncertain developments in northern Iraq. The U.S. is doing everything it can to keep the Turks from sending in their troops. If Saddam seems to be winning, the Turks may stay out. But if he seems to be losing, I don't think anything will keep them out. They know that because of this war the geography of the Middle East may change. And they are absolutely determined that there be no independent Kurdish state, not even an autonomous one. But the Kurds are equally determined. And the Iranians are also determined to have their say. So, should the war go on for several more weeks, there is a great chance that we shall have a war within a war, which in turn will make it militarily a lot more difficult for the United States.
Finally, antiwar sentiment across the world is remarkably strong. And there is some question how long the British government can hold out against it. Were the British ever to withdraw, then my scenario three becomes a distinct possibility - for political, but even for military, reasons.
2. On several occasions, you have argued against the contention that the US war against Iraq is "about oil". I was wondering if you could expand on this point a bit: do you see oil as one component among many which a victorious US would use to intimidate potential competitors and vassals? What do you make of the theory that holds that the US is being driven to establish greater control over world oil supplies by a deepening global energy crisis? What about the notion (recently endorsed by a number of writers, including Andre Gunder Frank) that the war against Iraq is being prosecuted in order to reverse a trend toward euro accounting among oil-producing states?
A: Well, of course, the U.S. is unhappy about the possibility of euro accounting. But this is far too small a reason for all this. And in any case, it is only a small part of a larger issue, the rise of an independent Europe. As for oil, I have argued that this is a dubious explanation, for two reasons. First, the U.S. position is already pretty good in terms of controlling world oil - the profits, the price levels, and the access; and the slight improvement a successful war would give them is not worth the candle. And secondly, the war actually jeopardizes their control of world oil, because it risks creating a major rift with Saudi Arabia, which has been the principal agent of the U.S. in controlling the world price of oil, the most important thing about world oil. So, if I were a White House advisor, and someone raised the issue of control of oil, I'd say, let well enough alone.
3. In case of a speedy US victory which is not immediately followed by the launching of another major military operation, what do you see as the short-term future of the popular antiwar movements in the US? in Europe? in the Arab world? What strategies do these movements need to pursue in order to remain relevant?
A: Of course, popular movements respond to the ups and downs of the headlines, to some extent. However, were there to be a speedy victory (which I doubt), I think the U.S. would begin the planning of another major military operation immediately, and the word would be out. In any case, the North Koreans have no intention whatsoever of cooling things down. So, I think the antiwar movement has a big future.
4. There are reports that Turkey has already sent troops across the Iraqi border. At this point, what are the chances that this action will lead to a major confrontation with the Kurds? How likely do you think is the intervention of other states in the region (primarily Iran and Syria) given the current state of affairs? What is the likely US response to all these interventions?
A: I already answered this. Once the war within the war were to begin in northern Iraq, it might indeed lead quickly to confrontations elsewhere - say between the Hezbollah and Israel. Also, don't forget Pakistan, which is not secure against an Islamist coup.
5. What is the likelihood that the Bush administration will seriously pursue a settlement between the Israelis and the Palestinians in the event of a victory in Iraq? in the event the war becomes bogged down? Could they succeed in forcing significantly worse terms on the Palestinians than were offered by Barak and Clinton in 2000?
A: The Bush administration's attitude towards Israel is conditioned by two factors: 1) the strong support for Israeli hawks by the Christian right and the neo-cons; 2) how it reads general U.S. sentiment, and therefore electoral considerations. At the moment, Bush is playing the Sharon card entirely. What card he might play in the future, given all the permutations of what could happen in Iraq, is an open question. But if I were the Palestinians, I would not be holding my breath for anything good coming from Bush.
6. Do you think it is probable that the Bush administration will attempt to economically punish those countries which opposed it in the UN Security Council (and which continue to oppose the war)? Are the fears of economic isolation by the US within these countries justified? What is the likelihood that such "punishment" will backfire on the US?
A: Yes, surely, if they can. But in general the U.S. is more dependent economically these days on western Europe than vice versa. They need Europe to act economically as if the US were a good place to invest and the dollar a good currency to hold. If they don't (and if Japan doesn't), the US economy could really spiral downward.
7. Jacques Chirac has stated that he will oppose any UN resolution which permits the US and Britain to administer Iraq in case of their victory, and number of European countries (including Britain) have pressed for involving the UN in the reconstruction process. Do you think that the US will in fact opt to occupy Iraq, and would France et al. be able to bring sufficient pressure to bear in order to forestall such a plan?
A: If the US wins, it will certainly occupy Iraq, at least at first, and at least as much as it can actually control. It won't give a fig newton for the UN. However, the UN sits on some Iraqi money (food for oil) and the US might not be able to get access to it without a Security Council resolution, at which point France comes into the picture. It's murky for the moment, but the US intends to be as unilateral as it can be. Even the British may not be able to get in for a role.
8. Has the EU, as many European commentators have suggested, sustained a serious internal rift as a result of its members' differences with regard to the US war in Iraq? What are the prospects for overcoming such a rift within the next five years? What (if any) role might Russia play in helping to heal this rift?
A: The European Union has had a basic rift for a long, long time - only they haven't wanted to bring it to the surface. It is the rift between those who conceive of Europe as a politically autonomous actor on the world scene and those who are "Atlanticists". Even without the Iraqi affair, Europe was in for a difficult time in terms of its institution-building. It could well be that one result of Iraq is the collapse (formal or virtual) of both NATO and the EU. Should that happen, Europe is not at all over. It would be rebuilt around the serious core. And I would bet that the odds are good that something viable and strong could emerge.
Russia heal the rift? Far from it. The role of Russia is part of the cause of the rift. The "autonomist" faction wants to pull Russia into Europe. The Atlanticist faction wants to exclude it.
9. Relatedly, was Chirac's thinly veiled threat to block those Eastern European countries which have sided with the US from accession to the EU a serious one? Can such countries expect substantial benefits from their support of the US in the foreseeable future?
A: The reality is that Chirac has a strong card. The reason why the east/central Europeans are with the US is that they are still living in fear of Russia. This fear is understandable but today a bit irrational. The US offers them rather little other than ideological comfort. Their economic links (trade, investment) are essentially with western Europe. The US will be about as reliable for them as it has been for the Kurds. They will soon become aware of this.
10. How likely are China and Russia to "manage" the Korean crisis now that war in Iraq has broken out? Is the US now more or less liable to meet Kim Jong Il's demands for bilateral negotiations?
A: It depends of course on the course of the war in Iraq. The easier the victory, the more the US will be intractable on North Korea, and the more North Korea will be provocative. Nuclear war on the Korean peninsula is not something we should rule out as a serious possibility. Of course, Japan, China, and South Korea are all scared to death of this prospect, and are in a panic because they feel they have to choose between the US role as a defender against Kim Il Jong and the US role as a launcher of a war no one can win.
11. There have been suggestions that China's opposition to the US in the Security Council was a mistake, because by blocking the US it has made the SC irrelevant and thereby lost a crucial international forum where it held a veto. Others, conversely, have argued that China has increased its stature, particularly in East Asia, precisely because its measured opposition to war has portrayed it as a more reasonable alternative to the US to countries in the region. Which position is closer to the truth?
A: The whole business about the veto (argued for France as well as China) is nonsense. It amounts to saying that by not using the veto, the French and the Chinese would have further opportunities to vote for US resolutions in the Security Council. The veto power is only meaningful if one uses it from time to time. And the US will come back to the Security Council, if it needs to, and won't if it doesn't.
Certainly neither China nor France have lost international standing as a result of their positions. Quite the opposite. This is why the US is so upset.
12. In the wake of the war, what is the future of the UN? Is the US likely to abandon it? Brazil has suggested using the General Assembly as a mechanism with which to try to rein in US global power. What are the chances of success of this strategy?
A: The hawks would have liked to abandon the UN 30 years ago, and would do so if they could today. The UN cannot be "reformed" because the veto power applies to any proposed reforms. And the General Assembly has no authority. In any case, the US has even less of a majority in the General Assembly than it has in the Security Council.
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