© Richard E. Lee 1997.
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[Paper presented at the American Comparative Literature Association meeting "Literature Between Philosophy and Cultural Studies", Notre Dame, IN, 11-13 April, 1996.]
Cultural Studies first arose as an intellectual project in Britain in the mid-1950's. It had roots in the work of the first New Left (particularly texts by Edward Thompson, Raymond Williams, and Richard Hoggart), but Cultural Studies was inscribed as well in the long-term tradition of literary and social criticism on the right stretching back through Matthew Arnold to Edmund Burke.
1956 was the pivotal year. The turn to "culture" as a major category of analysis was immediately occasioned by the geopolitical events of the cold war: Khrushchev's "secret speech" exposing Stalinism, the compromise in Poland, the 10,000 casualties of the Hungarian revolution, and the British/French/ Israeli conspiracy that was Suez. These events called into question the proud posturing of both the Communist, Stalinist, East, and the liberal, social democratic, West.
It was from this turmoil, "power without value" (Inglis 1991: 148), that sprang the first New Left in Britain. As developments in the Soviet East drove members out of the Communist Party, so the Labour Party's support of intervention in Egypt revealed the imperialist implications of the social- democratic consensus. Stuart Hall summed up "Hungary" and "Suez" as "'liminal', boundary-marking experiences. They symbolized the break-up of the political Ice Age" (1989: 13).
In the face of Stalinism and social democracy, neither of which seemed to offer people a capacity for controlling their own lives, the New Left reaffirmed humanist values and challenged the orthodox Marxist base/superstructure model. In reaction to the so very deterministic Stalinist model, it was the concept of "culture" which underpinned the sophisticated analyses which came out of the first New Left. This work converged on the relationship of politics and economics to art and everyday life in which real, historical, human beings actively created their own individual identities and social organization. Thompson argued that Stalinism denied "the creative agency of human labour, and thus of the value of the individual as an agent in society". Stalinism's opposition to Marx's basic humanism stemmed from a misappropriation, or mechanical expression, of the base-superstructure relationship (1957: 132). Williams also raised the standard of agency: the human energy of the social change he called the long revolution sprang "from the conviction that men can direct their own lives, by breaking through the pressures and restrictions of older forms of society, and by discovering new common institutions" (1961: 347). He, too, was unhappy with any simplistic interpretation of the base- superstructure model and his position paralleled that of Thompson in critiques of reductionism and economism.
However, the "turn" to culture as a significant category of analysis by the independent left in Britain during the late 1950's was just as surely a "return" to culture as a discourse of "values". "Culture" was the code-word around which the notions of Authenticity, Tradition and the Organic Community in Britain had coalesced over a century and a half, in opposition first to revolution, then to laissez-faire liberalism, and finally even to reforms elicited as a response to the dire inequalities liberalism produced.
As the legacy of the French Revolution dismantled any possibility of a static world, in England, the literary intellectual in the role of social critic became a central figure interpreting that world in which change was suddenly normal. Class and inequality and popular culture and education, treated as national issues, formed the terrain of the "Revolution Controversy" and the "Condition-of-England-Question" during the first half of the nineteenth century. The names of Burke, Paine, Cobbett, Wollenstonecraft, and Carlyle come to mind. This work was engaged and overtly political during this period when protest and insurgency went cruelly repressed.
The events of the 1860's, rebellion in Jamaica and Ireland and agitation for franchise reform at home, and the critique of laissez faire associated with them, precipitated a transformation of Liberalism. Both the black and the Irish experiences, dosed with Victorian representations of the feminine as irrational, sentimental, childish, unrestrained, and overly- sexualized, contributed to the redefinition of "freedom" as freedom from confinement (conceived from the position of slavery and impressment) to "liberty" as political liberty sustained in rights (understood as the prerogative of the rational, disciplined, and self-sufficient subject--read middle-class male, individual). Served by the new social sciences, this new Liberalism of ex-clusive nationalism absorbed both the conservative critique of laissez faire and assimilated the radical challenge.
In between the scientific and literary modes, in between the order of universal laws and the chaos of unrestricted freedom, T.H. Huxley discerned that
if the evils which are inseparable from the good of political liberty are to be checked, if the perpetual oscillation of nations between anarchy and despotism is to be replaced by the steady march of self-restraining freedom; it will be because men will gradually bring themselves to deal with political, as they now deal with scientific questions (Huxley 1881: 158-9).
In place of the Conservative rear-guard action and radical anarchy, both of which appealed to values, Huxley invokes the objective, value-neutral, problem-solving spirit of science to be applied to the social sphere. The practical question was the replacement of the binary opposition of the Order through the Authority of Tradition to the Chaos of Radicalism with the benign synthesis of Ordered Change through Scientific Control.
The result was that during the second half of the century the conspicuously political role of the critic as social agent was subtlely undermined. In the 1860's, social criticism was carried forward and solidified in pursuit of order, explicitly identified with culture by Matthew Arnold, and in opposition to radicalism, identified with anarchy. In the decades that followed, politics was suppressed in criticism itself as the social sciences took over the collective component of Arnold's project. As the century closed, art (art-for-art's-sake) lost its social referent and criticism slipped into asceticism. With popular politics increasingly out of its purview, English studies did war-time service in the propaganda campaigns, underwent technical development culminating in "practical criticism", and was effectively institutionalized as an anchor to national identity. The step-by-step process is quite clear. The activist criticism of the early nineteenth century was transformed via Arnold's espousal of order, "force 'till right is ready", in which he interpellated the state; Walter Pater's "internal flame" of disciplined contemplation; T.S. Eliot's timeless classicism, I.A. Richards's decontextualized close reading, and finally the Cambridge English circle and Scrutiny associated with F.R. and Q.D. Leavis, with its elitism and neglect of history.
Although practical politics may have been expunged, values remained a primary consideration. According to Arnold, the physical sciences offer "knowledge only ... knowledge not put for us into relation with our sense for conduct, our sense for beauty, and touched with emotion by being so put" (Arnold 1882: 65). Humane letters as the bearer of values can establish order, that is "a relation between the new conceptions, and our instinct for beauty, our instinct for conduct" (Arnold 1882: 66). Letters, Arnold suggests, allow for drawing proper conclusions from scientific research and are a necessary aspect of progress toward the conception of order as "the need in man for conduct ... the need in him for beauty" (Arnold 1882: 73) which encapsulates his whole critical project: "a strategy for containing radical new movements within traditional frameworks in the interests of social and cultural harmony" (Baldick 1983: 22). Leavis's 1962 response to C.P. Snow's Two Cultures was an echo of Arnold.
Williams explicitly acknowledged his debt to F.R. Leavis while recognizing the less attractive side of Leavisism. In Culture and Society (1958), from the specifically left oppositional position he shared with Thompson, Williams took the long-term literary-critical "tradition" as his explicit subject matter in order to rehabilitate its radical elements. For Hoggart, Leavis was a "looming and intransigent figure but one from whom many of us had learned more than from any other living critic, even if we had reservations about some of his views" (1992: 10, 62). But even Hoggart, the liberal, became increasingly uneasy and addressed his reservations in The Uses of Literacy. The notion in Part One of this book that working-class culture is intrinsically valuable and worthy of study, up-ends the high-culture tradition and presents us with one of the initial and lasting concerns of Cultural Studies. Part Two is condemnatory, an indictment of "invitations to self- indulgence" (1957: 142), which links it to the concerns of Leavis and the Scrutiny circle. Particularly through its efforts to evaluate and theorize mass culture, this represents a second major concern of Cultural Studies. Hoggart would have us
try to see beyond the habits to what the habits stand for, to see through the statements to what the statements really mean (which may be the opposite of the statements themselves), to detect the differing pressures of emotion behind idiomatic phrases and ritualistic observances (1957: 18).
The two major techniques he employs which were to be thoroughly exploited by Cultural Studies in its institutional context were literary analysis and ethnography. Certainly, one of his achievements was to extend literary critical methods to popular fields such as music, news media, and fiction. Ethnography, in this case, is a personal ethnography of his own working-class background.
The foundational texts kept close touch with the real, concrete, world. As Stuart Hall reminds us, "[w]hether historical or contemporary in focus, they were, themselves, focused by, organized through and constituted responses to, the immediate pressures of the time and society in which they were written" (1980: 58). As such the work of Thompson, Williams and Hoggart, besides concentrating on individual agency, rehabilitated questions of value in social and historical analyses.
Thompson wrote values back into the socialist tradition in his biography of the first major English-speaking Marxist, William Morris (1955). To address the "significance of literature" Thompson wrote a literary biography in which text and textual analysis play a central role in establishing the turning point of Morris's life as his conversion to socialism. Thompson was concerned with "a real silence in Marx, which lies in the area that anthropologists would call value systems". This was a major element belonging to the socialist tradition which mechanistic and reductionistic communist orthodoxy had effaced; its exposition "entailed unqualified resistance to Stalinism" (Thompson 1976: 21).
Certainly, the question of social values had also been a constituent factor of the conservative tradition of social criticism but was eclipsed as criticism was de-historicized and de-politicized. Is "culture" the elitist, high ideal of the "best that is known and felt" or the anthropological "whole way of life"? Although Maurice Cranston wrote that Williams was providing a "socialist theory of culture" (1959: 62), in his analysis Williams does not answer the question on the nature of culture directly but approaches it "democratically", bringing to light the diversity of strands woven together in the concept with the purpose of reappropriating the "tradition" to the struggle for an egalitarian future.
As Julia Swindells and Lisa Jardine have argued, Thompson and Williams fill crucial absences in one another's work.
Williams had been explicit about what he needed from Thompson--the historical knowledge. ... What Thompson needs from Williams ... is a particularly literary narrative, which can give agency to the characters of history, a narrative which is not the conventional one of the liberal historian, but one which can activate the categories of class and socialism (1990: 35).
From below, Hoggart was recuperating working-class experience which was being undermined by commercialism and validating it in the face of elite culture. From above, Williams was exposing the usurpation of texts of resistance and fighting against their appropriation by the forces of conservatism. Both, however, were limited by the gradual exclusion of power and history from the tradition of criticism to which they were heirs. In contrast, Thompson's history was political through and through and he lamented the absence of struggle in the work of both Hoggart and Williams.
Although Williams shared with Thompson a dedication to historical analysis inherent to Marxism, neither Williams nor Hoggart seemed to be writing just history, or sociology, or literary criticism for that matter. Williams and Hoggart approached their subject matter from the humanities, but their work rejected disciplinary boundaries, and the rejection was reciprocal: they defied the disciplines, and the disciplines disavowed them. Well received for its distinction, conviction and intellectual honesty, Hoggart's work did not fit into preestablished categories. His reviewers characterized his work as, according to one, that "of [a] gifted amateur in a field where modern sociological techniques of inquiry seem inadequate for the task at hand" (Tropp 1958: 221); and, according to another, "it must be said that this is not a report of professional social research. ... [It] is primarily a product of sensibility" (Freidson 1958: 98). Arthur Calder-Marshall wrote that "Like Mr. Hoggart's The Uses of Literacy, Mr. Williams's Culture and Society 1780-1950 and The Long Revolution are not works of scholarship but autobiographies of cultural displacement, disguised as objective studies" (1961: 217).
In sum, from its beginnings, Cultural Studies focused on questions associated with values articulated through the lived experience and individual agency of real historical human beings. Furthermore, Cultural Studies employed a variety of methods, especially literary/critical techniques and ethnography. This was a range of subject matters and methods which spanned all of the humanistic and social scientific disciplines. From the original consideration for working-class culture, the trajectory of Cultural Studies developed to include the mass media and the search for more systematic theoretical bases and methodological procedures. This led to the encounter with structuralism and poststructuralism which not only resulted in rich new insights but caustic polemic as well where the bone of contention was the linked concepts of human agency and historical time (see Hall 1980; Johnson 1978; and Thompson 1978). Throughout, however, the concern for values and a methodological ecumenism remained.
At this point, it is instructive to compare Cultural Studies as an oppositional enterprise, with its non-generalizing focus, its methodological heterogeneity, its nose-thumbing attitude towards the established disciplines, with the more systematic attempt to question the intellectual bases of social analysis at the end of the last century.
The primacy of the natural sciences based on the Cartesian/ Newtonian model was well established by the beginning of the nineteenth century and the intellectual hierarchy sealed with John Stuart Mill's arguments for the application of the principles of the "exact sciences" to "the backward state of the moral sciences" and Auguste Comte's move to establish positivism as the methodological ground of historical and social inquiry.
It was in the Germanies, rather than in England or France, where the great movement of reform and rejuvenation of the university, both as a teaching and a research structure, was taking place during the nineteenth century. As the German historical school developed the criteria of objectivity and critical use of archival documents into a "science of history", Geschichtswissenschaft, the universality of Ranke's vision grounded in the timeless "'holy hieroglyphe'--God with his plan and his will" (Breisach 1983: 233), balanced the picture of uniqueness and ceaseless change historians painted. However, with the rise of the Prussian state and its expansionist agenda, idealism gave way to the construction of a Volksgeist as a foundation for an in-clusive German nationalism underwriting unification. The decline of the transcendent element left historicism, as science, open to positivist challenge and charges of relativism. In the first instance, it could preserve its objectivity only at the loss of its ethical orientation; in the second, it would cease to qualify as a producer of systematic knowledge. Consequently, in an especially sustained way in Germany, but not only in Germany, efforts were made to rethink theory and method in social research.
The Methodenstreit, or controversy over the purpose, properties, method and domain of sociocultural knowledge (Oakes 1975: 19-20), which ensued as a reaction to positivism had as a central theme the construction of a philosophical defense of a connection between meaning and values, Wert, and systematic knowledge of reality, Wissen. In 1883, Wilhelm Dilthey began to make his case for an interpretative or hermeneutic approach to historically oriented human studies, the Geisteswissenschaften, roughly all of the humanities and the social sciences including history taken as a group, as distinguished from the Naturwissenschaften, the natural sciences. Dilthey considered it
philosophy's task to provide an epistemology that can show that the Geisteswissenschaften, although not as clearly definable in their first principles as the Naturwissenschaften, are no less fundamental, comprehensive, and objective in their results (Makkreel 1992: 38).
The original experiential foundation in descriptive psychology Dilthey proposed, denied "Ranke's claim that to see history objectively one must 'efface the self'" (Makkreel 1992: 54). He purposefully rejected the impersonal and abstract Kulturwissenschaften, with its occlusion of conflict and the unstated postulate of progress, in an on-going debate with the Baden neo-Kantians, Wilhelm Windelband and his student Heinrich Rickert.
Windelband, too, refused the positivists claim for a single logical unity among the sciences. His strategy was methodological and taxonomical. He classified all the empirical sciences by their autonomous logical form rather than substantive content as either nomothetic (sciences of law, Gesetzeswissenschaften) or idiographic (sciences of event, Ereigniswissenschaften). In order to preserve both certitude and human freedom, he relegated psychology to the natural sciences, thus rejecting "the contingencies of the historical and psychological subject in favor of the timelessly valid, transcendental subject of logic" (Bambach 1995: 63). However, as Windelband wrote at the end of his life: "The law and the event remain as the ultimate, incommensurable entities of our world view" (1980: 185).
Rickert extended Windelband's project with the explicit purpose of restoring meaning to history as science. He argued, however, that the difference between Natur- and Geisteswissenschaften was not one of classification, but one of concept formation--that is, the universal concept of similarity operational in the natural sciences and the particular concept of difference implicated in history. "Value" served as a formal, transcendental, a priori principle, "valid (geltend) rather than real (seiend)": as Charles Bambach writes,
an absolute reference point by which all objects in the world of being can be judged. ... Rickert rejected the relevance of temporality and historicity and insisted that values are transhistorical and transcultural, as well as absolute and unchanging in their validity (1995: 106).
Ethical imperatives guide both natural scientists and historians according to Rickert. He states that we
must see all the theories that believe they can reject the idea of freedom as being theoretically invalid. The crucial reason for this is that science itself needs freedom even when investigating causal connections. Only a theoretical (transcendental) subject who is not dependent on causality can take a position on the value of truth. Only when we grant the possibility of such a subject can we recognize something as being true and meaningful (Rickert in Bambach 1995: 117).
Dilthey repudiated this argument, along with the Kantian mathematical concept of time without concrete duration (as Troeltsch called it) and factuality without historicity, in favor of a science of history whose ground was the reality of temporal history itself to which all human beings belonged.
Dilthey aspired to overcome the extremes of both idealism (he was empirical) and positivism (he posited no general laws, since "consciousness can institute changes, human life cannot be viewed as totally determined by nature" (Makkreel 1992: 61)). For Dilthey, the original connectedness of life is directly available through lived experience (Erlebnis) and historical reason is replaced with reflective understanding (Verstehen) which articulates potential human significance provided by Erlebnis into "definite and exclusive possibilities" to "find meaning in history without positing a final goal" (Makkreel 1992: 257, 243). "A dynamic system (Wirkungszusammenhang)", the subject matter of human studies, Dilthey writes,
differs from the causal system (Kausalzusammenhang) of nature in that it produces values and realizes ends according to the structure of psychic life. ... Historical life is creative. It is constantly active in the productions of goods and values (quoted in Makkreel 1992: 315).
Any appeal to an idealized concept of value, such as in Rickert, denied the historicity of values and the value of historicity itself, including the historicity of knowledge or truth. In order to maintain the scientific status of human studies and respond to charges of relativism while maintaining the roots of inquiry in actual historical existence, Dilthey advanced a hermeneutic approach based on the study of "typical" individuals as "a human deliberation about the possibilities and limits of an individual's existence within a specific historical-cultural milieu" (Bambach 1995: 170). Dilthey had tried to fuse subject and object by arguing that both consciousness and the world shared the same temporality and historicity. But in the end, his effort to secure rigorous certitude without sacrificing human finitude was undermined by the project itself. Occupying as he did an intellectual space between the historicists and the neo- Kantians, he partook of the same fundamental commitment to the Cartesian Fragestellung in which truth was grounded in the "scientific objectivity" of the "self-knowing subject" (Bambach 1995: 181-2).
In the same year of the appearance of Dilthey's Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften, 1883, the Methodenstreit erupted in another sphere. The "historical school" of economics challenged the universality of deductive theory in the classical approach in favor of inductive history. As Ernst Breisach explains, this was
really a far-reaching dispute over the structure of reality. ... [As] Menger's followers opened the doors of economics even wider to psychology and mathematics ... economists preferred to theorize on the timeless and typical processes of the market and thereby moved ever closer to the ideals of the ahistorical natural sciences (1983: 299).
The historical approach of Schmoller emphasized the concrete, price history, actual past behavior, and description, while Menger's neoclassical, "pure", theory stressed the abstract, price theory, typical economic behavior, and universal theoretical models.
The marginalist revolution soon overcame the historicists position and established economics as a value-free discipline displacing political economy and Dilthey's project of finding a via media between the chaotic events of human affairs and the deterministic laws of the natural world without positing a new disciplinary sphere was finally put to rest by Max Weber. Weber argued against both the positivists and their opponents. On the one hand, he held fast to the axiological dimension and identified interpretation or understanding as the goal of human studies. At the same time, he emphasized the verifiability of knowledge in the sense of "sufficient ground": "A historical 'interpretative' inquiry into motives is causal explanation in absolutely the same logical sense as the causal interpretation of any concrete natural process" (1975: 194), he wrote. Operationally, however, he lifted his "ideal type" out of time and context and "historians [were] separated completely from the world of values they investigated. They [became] totally detached observers who objectively created islands of explained actions in a landscape of total obscurity" (Breisach 1983: 284)--again the choice was either order or chaos.
Positivism was to have its revenge in the form of behaviorism. The Vienna Circle of Logical Positivists "rejected the view ... that there is a radical distinction between the natural and the social sciences" (Ayer 1959: 21). According to Otto Neurath:
[S]ociology is not a "moral science" or "the study of man's spiritual life" (Sombart's "Geisteswissenschaft") standing in fundamental opposition to some other sciences, called "natural sciences", no, as social behaviorism, sociology is a part of unified science. ... The fruitfulness of social behaviorism is demonstrated by the establishment of new correlations and by the successful predictions made on the basis of them (Neurath 1931-32: 296, 317).
Behaviorism was fundamentally linked to replicable, empirical studies--an experimental method based on the observation of independent cases--and thus could claim objectivity. Judged against Neurath's standard, its record is dubious at best, but by the 1950's when its moment had waned somewhat in psychology, behaviorism became widely influential in American quantitative social analysis and political science in particular.
In anthropology and oriental studies, time, by definition, had simply never been a problem, either regarding the "peoples without history" or the timeless civilizations.
The importance of Dilthey's project was that it had been based on ontological rather than epistemological concerns; he had made a bid to reclaim phenomenological time for both the natural and the human sciences. His failure was contingent on the Cartesian principles (the subjective reality of history versus the objective ideal of science) from which he was unable to dissociate himself. The eventual consequence was the grounding by epistemological default of a scientistic third culture between Wert and Wissen based on the "scientific" criteria of value-neutrality and a neutral or absolute time.
The universal laws characteristic of the natural sciences depend on a Newtonian or reversible time associated with absolute determinism and therefore predictive certainty. The Human Studies, by contrast, are eminently historical; past and future are not interchangeable. But the scientific study of society is exactly what Huxley and so many others advanced as grounding for a separate, that is a third, disciplinary domain between the sciences and the humanities to be occupied by the social sciences. For to the extent that one could uncover social laws, one could predict and thus control the future. And here lies the functional link between the social sciences and the reformist liberalism of incremental progress.
Hoggart had a wonderful phrase describing time without values: "like the clicking-over of lantern-slides with no informing pattern" (1957: 159). In fact, in a less systematic way, the trajectory of cultural studies over the past forty years has been much a replay of the foregoing debates. From the beginning cultural studies was concerned with the study of values, from the inside (Inglis 1993). But Cultural Studies, "disciplined" as it, or they, are in an institutional context which structurally subordinates knowledge which does not aspire to subsume particulars to universals, is foundering on the same shoals as the Geisteswissenschaften did. Is it then time to write the epitaph of Cultural Studies? I think this is the wrong question.
Hoggart opposed the impressionistic social commentary of the novel just as he contested what he called the additive models of quantitative social science which had come to dominate in the United States. These latter fractured the whole-way-of-life concept of culture he shared with Williams and sapped it of meaning. Both quantitative methods and the orthodox Marxist model robbed Thompson's whole-way-of-struggle of history and the lived experience of real human agents. Certainly Thompson's biography of Morris and his rehabilitation of forgotten voices of resistance in The Making of the English Working Class (1963) recall Dilthey's emphasis on concrete human beings as the key to historical knowledge. Fred Inglis has recently stated the concept explicitly: "A biography ... is the readiest way we have of getting some purchase on our history and understanding who has been responsible for it. A good biography, however, brief, should signify ... [that is] recover the best meaning" (1991: 3).
By the end of the 1960's, as the trajectory of Cultural Studies moved out from the original consideration for working- class culture, the concerns for values, agency, and historical time came into conflict with the anti-humanist and a-temporal tendencies of structuralism which seemed to announced the demise of any possibility of constructing totalizing narratives. The most skeptical assessment has been that we have reached a particularistic low, of a localist relativism and political paralysis, in the the disconnected stories we tell. However, the anti-essentialism, the anti-foundationalism, and the demise of the subject as theorized by poststructuralism, have also nullified the Cartesian dualities on which Dilthey's project collapsed.
During the same period from the late 1960's, the "new sciences", emphasizing complexity, irreversibility, and self- organization, have effectively abdicated a role of guarantor of truth in knowledge and reintroduced the arrow-of-time into the natural sciences (see Lee 1992). The world of nature, like the human world, has now been shown to bring order out of chaos--it is creative; the future is an open future, rather than a predictable Newtonian one, determined only by creative choices and contingent circumstances at unstable moments of transition. This has the effect of freeing knowledge production from the aporia of uncovering infinite disconnected particulars in search of impossible universals. In a world recognized as creative in all its aspects, values and knowledge, Wert and Wissen, are necessarily fused.
These discussions are especially relevant today in the context of the perceived "crisis of the university". This can be summed up as the interlocking pressures of a triple conjuncture since 1968: one is economic or material, that of declining resources meeting expanding demand; a second is political or ideological, that of rising expectations based on the rhetoric of success through education encountering the reality of limitations on both rewards and access; and the third is intellectual or theoretical, that of an objective, value-neutral ideal at the heart of the institutional apparatus of the university challenged by epistemologies of skepticism and complexity.
Such destabilizing structural pressures are forcing change, but unlike the situation a century ago, those of us searching for a way out of the contemporary intellectual, political, and institutional quandaries have been liberated from the Cartesian/ Newtonian constraints. The structural sequestration of the spheres of knowledge no longer appears as an unquestioned given. The study of government need not necessarily be isolated from the study of language, or analyses of market operation automatically separated from considerations of culture in departments like Political Science, English, Economics, Sociology or Art History. Indeed, it has become a legitimate proposition to say that they "should not be isolated or separated". Defensible, intersubjective interpretations of relationships among constituent parts of concrete wholes on the other hand suggest a realizable mode of scholarly participation in the creation of a world where "social" is no longer forced to serve as the qualifying adjective for a dubious branch of "science".
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