

Black Liberation and the Spirit of '57:  
The Ghana-Guinea Legacy

Paper presented to the Conference on  
"Black Liberation and the Spirit of '57"

Binghamton University  
November 2-3, 2007

Elizabeth Schmidt  
Professor  
History Department  
Loyola College in Maryland  
4501 N. Charles St.  
Baltimore, MD 21210-2699  
410-617-2432  
[eschmidt@loyola.edu](mailto:eschmidt@loyola.edu)



A half a century ago, in March 1957, the British colony of the Gold Coast became the independent nation of Ghana--the first of scores of sub-Saharan African colonies to obtain political independence.<sup>1</sup> The following year, the French West African territory of Guinea rejected continued French tutelage in an empire-wide referendum, claiming its independence in October 1958.<sup>2</sup> Events subsequently unfolded in rapid succession. In 1960, at a dinner in Accra hosted by Ghanaian president Kwame Nkrumah, British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan observed that “the wind of change” was blowing across the African continent and that the tide of African nationalism could not be stopped.<sup>3</sup> By the year’s end, the Belgian Congo, Nigeria, and British and Italian Somaliland had witnessed the end of colonial rule. The French African empire disintegrated as the United Nations trusts of Togo and Cameroon, the island of Madagascar, the four territories of former French Equatorial Africa, and the seven remaining territories of former French West Africa claimed their independence.<sup>4</sup> In three short years, most of the continent had followed in Ghana’s wake.

Despite the diversity of their ethnic, cultural, and linguistic backgrounds and their disparate colonial histories, Ghana and Guinea shared many traits. Their drives to independence were spearheaded by mass parties with broad ethnic, class, and regional bases--the Convention People’s Party (CPP) in Ghana and the Guinean branch of the interterritorial Rassemblement Démocratique Africain (RDA).<sup>5</sup> Both parties made special appeals to women, who were important forces for political mobilization.<sup>6</sup> They were closely linked to trade unions and successfully used labor strikes and other forms of mass action to achieve their objectives. The CPP and the Guinean RDA were generally opposed by chiefs, aristocrats, and the most highly educated of the Western-educated elites. They were disparaged as parties of the

uneducated rabble, who had neither the right nor the capacity to rule. Their leaders, Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana and Sékou Touré of Guinea, extolled the virtues of the “African personality” and uniquely African forms of socialism. They promoted national and international, as opposed to “tribal” or ethnic, identities and attempted to forge unitary states from disparate regional and ethnic components. They decried the balkanization of the continent into dozens of small, politically and economically impoverished units contained within the irrational bounds of former colonies and championed Pan-Africanism as a means of achieving strength and combating neocolonialism. In the formation of the Ghana-Guinea Union in November 1958, they made a valiant attempt to bridge the anglophone-francophone divide. Both men hoped that this union would be the core of a future United States of Africa that would promote the ideals of black liberation continent-wide.<sup>7</sup>

The newly independent countries also suffered from similar problems. Their vision distorted by Cold War concerns, Western powers considered both countries suspect, equating radical nationalism with communism and nonalignment with a tilt toward the eastern bloc. Fearing the spread of their influence, Western countries targeted Ghana and Guinea politically and economically. When faced with internal opposition, with or without foreign support, both governments cracked down hard. Subversion, real and imagined, became an excuse for squelching domestic dissent. The mass parties that had led the countries to independence degenerated into party machines run from the top down, with few mechanisms for influence from the base. Personality cults developed around both leaders. Both nation-building experiments ended badly. Nkrumah was ousted in a military coup in 1966 and spent his remaining years in exile in Guinea. Following Sékou Touré’s death in 1984, the military seized

power in Guinea and has ruled it ever since. While Kwame Nkrumah and Sékou Touré continue to be revered throughout Africa and its diaspora as leaders of the Pan-African and nationalist movements, in their own countries their legacy has been decidedly mixed.

### The Emergence of Mass Parties

Unlike most political parties in post-World War II Africa, the CPP and the Guinean RDA were composed primarily of commoners and people without high levels of Western education. The CPP had broken off from the United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC), a party of Western-educated and “traditional” elites, while the Guinean RDA had been established in opposition to ethnically and elite-based parties. Established in 1947, the UGCC was composed primarily of members of the “political class,” that is, chiefs, businessmen, and Western-educated elites, all of whom had a stake in the colonial system. The leaders sought gradual reforms that would benefit their class, rather than fundamental political change. However, they were astute enough to recognize that their party needed the support of the common people even to achieve these modest goals. Nkrumah was recruited as general secretary specifically to establish such links. He proposed the expansion of party membership to include trade unionists, market women, fishermen, artisans, and farmers. He urged the party to increase its strength by joining forces with peasants’ cooperative societies and military veterans’, farmers’, and women’s associations. He challenged it to move beyond its urban coastal base, mobilizing the rural populations of the interior.<sup>8</sup>

In spite of, or more likely because of, these grandiose plans, the relationship between Nkrumah and the political class was strained from the outset. Nkrumah envisioned the use of direct action campaigns, marked by “constant demonstrations throughout the country,” similar to

those conducted by Gandhi in India and the African National Congress Youth League in South Africa. Through strikes, boycotts, and demonstrations, the people would exert continuous pressure on the government to implement reforms. The goal would be the establishment of a constitutional assembly and the production of a constitution for self-government or national independence. While Nkrumah promoted radical tactics as the only vehicle for success, UGCC elites worried about the wider ramifications of mobilizing the masses. If the “rabble” acquired power and influence, what would become of them?<sup>9</sup>

Frustrated by the conservative methods and uninspired vision of other party leaders, Nkrumah and like-minded colleagues in the UGCC formed the Committee on Youth Organization (CYO), which was composed of the younger, more radical members of the party. Unlike their elders, members of the CYO called for “Self-Government NOW.” They were not prepared to wait indefinitely or accept vague promises for the future. In June 1949, after much internal debate, the CYO broke from the UGCC and formed the Convention People’s Party.<sup>10</sup> Although quite moderate in retrospect, the CPP’s program was considered radical at the time. The new party did not call for extra-legal action, a break with the chiefs, or complete independence. Rather, it vowed to “fight relentlessly by all constitutional means for achievement of full Self-Government NOW, for the chiefs and people of the Gold Coast.”<sup>11</sup> Nonetheless, UGCC leaders felt seriously threatened. Veiling their discomfort with derision, they denigrated CPP leaders as “Standard VII Boys,” in reference to their relatively low levels of Western education, and belittled their followers as “verandah boys, hooligans, flotsam and jetsam, town rabble.”<sup>12</sup>

Like the UGCC, the Guinean branch of the RDA was established in 1947. Although they were founded in the same year, the UGCC and the Guinean RDA had little else in common. The UGCC was similar in both composition and objectives to the elite, regionally and ethnically-based parties that rivaled the Guinean RDA. The Guinean RDA, in contrast, built a successful, if fragile, national alliance that embraced men and women of all ethnicities, classes, and regions. While the UGCC and its French West African counterparts had few mechanisms for grassroots participation and were dominated by political, economic, and religious elites who had a stake in the colonial system, the Guinean RDA was relatively democratic in both structure and practice. While young militants in the Gold Coast were forced to leave the UGCC to establish their own more radical party, in Guinea, pressure from the grassroots pushed the Guinean RDA increasingly to the left. Therefore, the more apt comparison is between the Guinean RDA and the CPP, rather than the UGCC.

Just as the CPP was disparaged in the Gold Coast, elites in Guinea referred to the RDA as a party of prostitutes, school drop-outs, and divorced women. It was derided as “a party of girls, social climbers--tasteless women who crudely mimic the upper classes.”<sup>13</sup> Guinean RDA leaders included large numbers of professionals from the bottom of the civil service hierarchy, who were products of lower state schools. Stymied by their lack of higher diplomas, these civil servants were unable to rise through the ranks.<sup>14</sup> For the six years preceding independence, the party was led by Sékou Touré, a low-level civil servant who had distinguished himself as one of the most successful trade unionists in French West Africa. The higher echelons of the civil service, staffed primarily by graduates of the prestigious William Ponty federal school in Senegal, tended to be hostile to the RDA.<sup>15</sup> The most privileged of the “modernizing” elites, Ponty alumni

generally joined officially-sanctioned parties--and were dismissed as “valets of the administration” by RDA members.<sup>16</sup> Many Ponty graduates considered Sékou Touré to be beneath them, deriding him as an “illiterate,” or at most, a man with “a sixth-grade education.”<sup>17</sup> This erroneous assessment reflected the fact that, like most Guinean RDA leaders, Sékou Touré was not a Ponty graduate. However, compared to the majority of his compatriots, he was well-educated, having attended lower-primary and vocational schools before continuing his studies by correspondence.<sup>18</sup>

### The Colonial Chieftaincy

In both territories, chiefs were important instruments of indirect rule, implementing hated colonial practices such as tax collection. Popular mobilization against the “feudal” chiefs and their abuses were taken up by both parties. Initially, the Guinean RDA and the CPP hoped to marginalize the corrupt chieftaincy and replace it with modern local government structures. They were opposed by Peul aristocrats in Guinea’s Futa Jallon and by Asante chiefs and royalty in the Gold Coast, whose power and position were threatened by the challenge of youth, urban-dwellers, and the poor—the descendants of slaves and commoners without rank or right. These “traditional” elites were deeply disturbed by the parties’ appeal to youth and the lower classes, who showed scant regard for longstanding hierarchies of age and authority.<sup>19</sup>

While their attitudes may have been similar, the CPP and the Guinean RDA pursued different strategies in dealing with the chieftaincy. Both parties recognized the need to mobilize rural support and understood that the chiefs held the keys to the rural population. The CPP ultimately abandoned its attempt to destroy the chieftaincy and concentrated instead on co-opting the chiefs and subordinating them to the party agenda. After independence, the chiefs were

totally dependent on the government for income and legitimacy. The chiefs' discontent was evident when they threw their support to the military government in the wake of the 1966 coup. Like Guinea's military rulers in 1984, the military government in Ghana championed "traditional" values that it claimed its predecessors had undermined. In Ghana, that "tradition" included respect for the chieftaincy.<sup>20</sup> In Guinea, the RDA-dominated local government, established in May 1957, took advantage of its new powers to implement a fundamental change in colonial administration. In December 1957, it abolished the institution of the canton chieftaincy, and in so doing, eliminated a longstanding obstacle to RDA success in the rural areas. Throughout the 1950s, the chiefs had used their influence to manipulate elections to the detriment of the RDA. Rabidly hostile to the party and with significant coercive powers at the local level, the chiefs had thwarted RDA ascendancy in the rural areas for nearly a decade. Had they survived, the canton chiefs may well have forced a different outcome to the 1958 referendum that led to Guinea's independence.<sup>21</sup>

#### Internal Self-Government and its Limits

In both countries, independence was preceded by a period of local self-government that was criticized by radicals as being the first step toward neocolonialism rather than true independence. This period lasted for six years in the Gold Coast (1951-1957) and a year and a half in Guinea (May 1957-October 1958).<sup>22</sup> While the Gold Coast was lauded for being the first sub-Saharan African colony to obtain internal self-government, the achievement came at a price. Nkrumah was not elected president or prime minister, but "leader of government business." While his government was run by African ministers, its powers were highly circumscribed. It had no control over foreign policy, national defense, or internal security. It could not hire and

fire civil servants. The civil service was answerable to British authorities, rather than the local African government. Not surprisingly, this agency, theoretically charged with implementing government policy, obstructed all fundamental change.<sup>23</sup> Africans were in office, but not in power. Colonial laws, institutions, and economic structures remained. Together with chiefs and kings and other hierarchies manipulated under colonial rule, these structures and institutions bound the new country to its colonial past.<sup>24</sup>

In March 1957, just weeks after the Gold Coast became the independent nation of Ghana, Guinea elected its own local government. By the mid-1950s, the French empire had been shaken on several fronts, notably in Indochina and North Africa. In Indochina, the Viet Minh, a broad-based national liberation movement led by the communist revolutionary, Ho Chi Minh, defeated the French at Dien Bien Phu in May 1954. France withdrew from Indochina shortly thereafter. Within months of the French defeat, the Front de Libération Nationale launched a war for independence in Algeria. Meanwhile, armed conflict escalated in Tunisia and Morocco, ultimately leading to their independence in 1956. Under duress, France embarked on a program of imperial reform in order to salvage what was left of the empire.<sup>25</sup> The result was a new legal framework or *loi-cadre*, enacted on June 23, 1956, which authorized the French government to implement a series of legal reforms that would lead to limited self-government in the overseas territories.<sup>26</sup> It was hoped that limited self-government would forestall the move toward complete independence.<sup>27</sup>

In Guinea, the year 1956 also marked a turning point in electoral politics. The colonial administration initiated a new policy of *détente* with the RDA. Repression eased, and the hostile colonial chieftaincy was effectively neutralized. As a result, the RDA amassed significant

victories at the polls. In March 1957, the RDA swept away virtually all opposition in the Territorial Assembly. As a result, the new *loi-cadre* government, established in May 1957, was dominated by the RDA<sup>28</sup> In Guinea as in the Gold Coast, self-government fell far short of independence. As before, the chief executive of the territory was an appointed governor with enormous authority. Although some of his powers had been absorbed by the council of government, the governor continued to be in charge of foreign affairs, defense, the fiscal and monetary system, and economic, social, and cultural development. He oversaw the council of government and could request that the territorial assembly reconsider its decisions and that the French government nullify decisions of both the territorial assembly and the council of government.<sup>29</sup>

#### Political Independence and its Limits

In 1957, as Guinea began the task of self-government, the Gold Coast attained political independence. As the first sub-Saharan African country to achieve this status, Ghana became a symbol of hope and inspiration throughout Africa and the diaspora. Following Ghana's example, mass-based nationalist parties in other territories emerged or grew stronger. Increasingly, they agitated for political independence rather than colonial reform. However, even as Ghana emerged as an important symbol of black pride and potential, the limitations of its political independence were apparent. It quickly became clear that decolonization was not synonymous with self-determination. In 1951, Nkrumah wrote, much of the Gold Coast's population was impoverished; over 80 percent were illiterate. Infrastructure was lacking and, with the exception of gold and diamond mining, there were virtually no industries. The economy was heavily dependent on the export of cocoa.<sup>30</sup> When political independence came in 1957,

economic independence was not foreordained. The mercantilist practices of colonialism remained. Ghana, and the countries that followed its lead, were burdened by neocolonial economic systems in which they continued to produce cheap raw materials for export and to import expensive manufactured goods from the former colonial power. The mining industry was foreign-owned, and earnings were repatriated to benefit Britain and the United States, rather than retained to develop Ghana. The new nation learned the lesson that would soon become painfully familiar to others in Africa: political independence without economic power had relatively little value.<sup>31</sup>

While Ghana assessed the strengths and weaknesses of political independence, the system of local self-government in the French colonies came under attack. In 1958, as deficiencies in the system were exposed, the French government made a further attempt to keep Africans in the imperial fold. Prime Minister Charles de Gaulle proposed a new constitution that would grant the overseas territories junior partnership in a French-dominated community, in lieu of independence. In the hope that small, economically fragile states would be less likely to seek independence than large, relatively prosperous ones, the great federations of French West and Equatorial Africa were scheduled for dissolution. In the empire-wide referendum, Guinea alone rejected the constitution and opted for immediate independence.<sup>32</sup> As Ghana and Guinea challenged the limitations of local self-government and urged other countries to claim their independence, they found themselves in direct confrontation with Charles de Gaulle. The French prime minister worried that the radical influence of Ghana and Guinea might induce other territories to follow their lead. Moreover, Ghana's increased stature might strengthen the

position of anglophone countries in Africa, opening the door to interference from Britain and the United States in an area that France considered its privileged sphere of action.<sup>33</sup>

Aware of their countries' structural weaknesses, as well as the strength of the forces arrayed against them, both Nkrumah and Touré championed Pan-African political and economic unity as both a remedy and a way forward. Embracing nationalist leaders from Africa, North America, and the Caribbean, the Pan-African movement stressed the unity found in Africa and its many diasporic peoples. Both Nkrumah and Touré stressed the positive qualities of the "African personality." Like other Pan-Africanists, they stressed the commonalities found in African cultures, values, and world views, and the shared experience of colonial oppression. These factors united African peoples and counterbalanced the divisive tendencies of ethnic and regional factionalism.<sup>34</sup> Nkrumah famously called for a United States of Africa, which would join hundreds of millions of Africans in a common political and economic unit. Similarly, Sékou Touré was an outspoken critic of the balkanization of francophone Africa, as envisioned in France's 1958 constitution. A staunch federalist, he advocated independence on the basis of the large French West and Equatorial African federations, rather than the small, economically precarious territorial units.<sup>35</sup> Only a united front could lead the way out of the poverty and powerlessness resulting from colonial fragmentation.

Once Ghana had obtained its independence, the promotion of Pan-African unity became one of Nkrumah's top priorities. Under his leadership, Ghana moved to the forefront of forces combating racism and tribalism and supporting African liberation continent-wide. In April 1958, Nkrumah hosted a meeting in Accra of eight independent African nations. Besides Ghana, the participants included Ethiopia, Liberia, Egypt, Morocco, Libya, Tunisia, and Sudan. The

participants declared their support for the liberation struggles in Algeria and South Africa and for African decolonization more generally.<sup>36</sup> As Nkrumah subsequently wrote,

...the freedom and independence of Ghana is meaningless unless it is linked up with the total liberation of Africa. As the international platform of the Convention People's Party programme states: The Party seeks to establish fraternal relations with, and offer guidance and support to, all nationalist, democratic and socialist movements in Africa and elsewhere which are fighting for national independence and self-determination on the one hand and whose programmes are opposed to imperialism, colonialism, racialism, tribalism and religious sectarianism and all other forms of national, racial, tribal and religious chauvinism and oppression, on the other. We are working towards making this policy a reality. That is why we insist that in Ghana in the higher reaches of our national life, there should be no reference to Fantis, Ashantis, Ewes, Gas, Dagombas, "strangers", and so forth, but that we should call ourselves Ghanaians--all brothers and sisters, members of the same community--the state of Ghana. For until we ourselves purge from our own minds this tribal chauvinism and prejudice of one against the other, we shall not be able to cultivate the wider spirit of brotherhood which our objective of Pan Africanism calls for. We are all Africans and peoples of African descent, and we shall not allow the imperialist plotters and intriguers to separate us from each other for their own advantage.<sup>37</sup>

Six months after the Accra meeting, Guinea joined the ranks of independent African nations. Having voted overwhelmingly for independence in the constitutional referendum on September 28, the French territory of Guinea officially became the independent Republic of

Guinea on October 2. Having declared that any country voting for independence would “bear the consequences,” de Gaulle was quick to carry out his threats.<sup>38</sup> Immediately after the referendum, France severed most of its economic ties to Guinea, suspending bank credits, development assistance, and cooperative endeavors.<sup>39</sup> Technical services were sabotaged and equipment destroyed. Telephone wires were cut. Cranes at the port of Conakry disappeared. Military camps were stripped of their equipment and hospitals of their medicines.<sup>40</sup> Ships bound for Guinea with food and medicine were diverted to other territories. Businesses and private individuals transferred large sums of money out of the country.<sup>41</sup> To prevent Guinea from using its CFA franc reserves for external purchases, the Bank of France cancelled the old currency. Meanwhile, the French secret services peppered the country with counterfeit money, creating widespread panic.<sup>42</sup> The denial of bank credit, deprivation of vital goods and services, and discouragement of private investment were explicitly designed to provoke economic panic, political discontent, and civil unrest. By stimulating chaos in the economic and administrative sectors, the French government hoped to demonstrate Guinea’s inability to assume the responsibilities of independence.<sup>43</sup>

If France devastated Guinea economically and rebuffed it diplomatically, the former imperial power also embarked on a campaign to isolate the new nation internationally.<sup>44</sup> Concerned that the Soviet Union would fill the void left by France, the United States had urged France to take the lead in recognizing the independent country so that its Western allies could follow suit. France had refused and explicitly told the United States to refrain from recognizing Guinea on its own.<sup>45</sup> Out of deference to its NATO ally, and wishing to avert tension with the prickly French prime minister, the United States cautiously followed the French lead.<sup>46</sup> Thus, on

October 2, the independent African nations of Ghana and Liberia became the first countries to recognize the sovereign state of Guinea. They were followed by various communist powers--the Soviet Union on October 5 and the People's Republic of China on October 6. Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia recognized Guinea shortly thereafter, while East Germany opened a trade mission. The Western powers, in contrast, spurned Guinea's overtures. France, West Germany, Great Britain, and the United States delayed recognition and stalled on offers of economic, technical, and military assistance.<sup>47</sup>

The anti-Guinea campaign was aided by Félix Houphouët-Boigny, head of the Ivory Coast's local government and president of the interterritorial RDA. Furious at what he considered to be Sékou Touré's betrayal, Houphouët-Boigny urged the French government to undermine him.<sup>48</sup> On October 7-9, at the behest of Houphouët-Boigny and the French government, the interterritorial RDA expelled the Guinean branch from its ranks.<sup>49</sup> In a press interview on October 15, Houphouët-Boigny warned France that it must not give preference to territories that had seceded over those that had chosen the French Community. Such a policy would send the wrong message to loyal territories.<sup>50</sup>

#### Nationalism vs. Pan-Africanism

On October 19, 1958, the Guinean RDA, now called the Parti Démocratique de Guinée, publicly disassociated itself from the RDA. The party declared itself the ally of any democratic organization that stood for African unity and independence.<sup>51</sup> The new nation began to seek associates outside its old cohort in francophone Africa. In late November, Sékou Touré made a state visit to Ghana, where he and Nkrumah established the Ghana-Guinea Union.<sup>52</sup> In December, Touré, Nkrumah, and other nationalist leaders convened the All-African Peoples

Conference in Accra. The conference brought together together political and trade union leaders from across the continent, including Patrice Lumumba, who, in 1960, would become prime minister of the independent Congo.<sup>53</sup> The participants agreed to fight “racialism and tribalism” and to “work for the ultimate achievement of a Union or Commonwealth of African States.” Echoing the sentiment of the conference, Nkrumah made a call for unity that resembled that of the French African federalists. Like his francophone counterparts, Nkrumah warned of the dangers of fragmentation:

I hope to see in Africa, not a large number of small and weak countries subject to all the dangers of Balkanisation, but rather the evolution of some sort of African union. Such a union need not prejudice the local autonomy of individual territories, but it would provide a mechanism which would allow Africa as a whole to co-ordinate its defence, its main lines of economic and foreign policies, and its economic development.<sup>54</sup>

In July 1961, Mali joined the Ghana-Guinea Union, which was renamed the Union of African States. Its charter expressed the hope that the union would serve as the “nucleus of the United States of Africa.”<sup>55</sup>

This was not to be. It quickly became clear that the struggle for African emancipation would go in a different direction. In May 1963, a group of newly independent African nations met in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, where they established the Organization of African Unity (OAU). Although the OAU bore the imprint of Nkrumah’s and Toure’s ideas, it fell far short of the United States of Africa they had envisioned. It had few of the federal powers deemed critical to its success. Unity among nations was both fragile and superficial. Deaf to the Nkrumahs and Tourés who warned of the dangers of balkanization, the OAU endorsed the principle of

independence within the old colonial boundaries, however irrational. This solution, although flawed, was intended to thwart the emergence of ethnically-based secessionist movements that might plague the continent with endless warfare. While these concerns were legitimate, the determination was also stimulated by other less laudable reasons. Jealous of their new powers as heads of state, few leaders were willing to relinquish their positions in order to form larger, more viable nations. Although the OAU survived for 40 years and served as an important voice in support of African emancipation, it was accused by its critics of being little more than a talk shop, without even basic enforcement powers.<sup>56</sup>

Disbanded in 2002, the OAU was succeeded by the African Union, which was intended to be more efficient and effective than its predecessor. An amalgam of the OAU and the African Economic Community, the African Union was strongly influenced by the principles underlying Nkrumah's and Touré's Union of African States. Its objective is to integrate the continent politically and economically and to promote peace, stability, and sustainable development. The African Union's Constitutive Act provides for a Pan-African Parliament, and a Court of Justice, a common defense policy, and integrated financial institutions. Despite its greater enforcement powers, the African Union perpetuates many of the OAU's weaknesses. Its members, like those of the OAU, have pledged to respect "borders existing on achievement of independence"—that is, colonial boundaries. The African Union Assembly, composed of the heads of state and government of members nations, may vote to intervene in a nation's internal affairs only if it determines that "war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity" are being perpetrated.<sup>57</sup> The crimes of corrupt, dictatorial heads of state often fall short of these definitions. Moreover,

such leaders are not likely to vote in favor of intervention either in their own states or in those of like-minded neighbors.

### External Subversion and Internal Oppression

Not only did Pan-African unity fail to materialize to the degree envisioned by Nkrumah and Touré, nation-building in Ghana and Guinea fell far short of their ideals. Both countries were victims of Cold War meddling by Western powers. Both were ostracized as puppets of Moscow and undermined as centers of revolutionary subversion and threats to continental stability. Their nonalignment in international affairs and economic relations with eastern bloc countries were viewed with suspicion. Concerned that their radical influence might spread to other territories, Western powers supported internal forces that attempted to overthrow both governments. Determined to destroy the man he could not seduce, de Gaulle ordered the French secret services to undermine Sékou Touré's government. For two decades, France engaged in successive plots to overthrow the Guinean president—sometimes with the assistance of espionage services from West Germany, Portugal, and the United States. None of the coup attempts was successful.<sup>58</sup> In Ghana, an attempt was made on Nkrumah's life in 1964. Two years later, his government was overthrown in a military coup, aided and abetted by disgruntled chiefs, aristocrats, and members of the old "political class."<sup>59</sup>

Other problems were of their own making. Both Nkrumah and Touré opposed multi-party systems, fearing that they would lead to regional fragmentation and tribalism, rather than unitary nation-building. However, without viable opposition parties, the mass democratic organizations of the nationalist period were rapidly transformed into top-down centralized parties that valued loyalty above all else. Both leaders succumbed to the attractions of personality cults,

in which party, state, and leader were synonymous. They became increasingly intolerant of dissent. In the wake of coup plots and assassination attempts, both engaged in preventive detention, a tactic of the old colonial regimes, to combat internal subversion—real and imagined.<sup>60</sup>

Even before independence, the CPP had begun to impose policies from above and to stifle discontent at the grassroots. Strikes, which had helped to weaken the colonial system, were outlawed, and the trade union movement was co-opted by the party. Meanwhile, corrupt CPP leaders lived in luxury, benefitting from corruption and party patronage, while the majority of their compatriots languished in poverty. Worse, the poor, rather than the wealthy, were expected to subsidize national development.<sup>61</sup>

In pre-independence Guinea, the RDA's local party structures had been strong, and grassroots militants had participated in the development of the party program. As a result, anti-democratic agendas were thwarted by popular mobilization. However, there is ample evidence that a personality cult was developing around Sékou Touré even before independence and that the latter had a tendency toward unilateral action.<sup>62</sup> Given the dearth of educated personnel, trade union and party leaders frequently accumulated multiple functions, concentrating considerable power in relatively few hands. When the September 1958 referendum occurred, Sékou Touré was the unofficial leader of Guinea's trade union movement and secretary-general of the Guinean RDA. He was a councillor in the Territorial Assembly, a deputy in the French National Assembly, mayor of Conakry, and president of Guinea's *loi-cadre* government.<sup>63</sup> Moreover, after the establishment of the *loi-cadre* government in May 1957, the Guinean RDA leadership became increasingly intolerant of internal and external dissent. Within the party, students, teachers, and trade unionists were sanctioned—and one subsection was expelled—for

disobedience and obstructionism. The interests of labor, long the mainstay of the RDA program, increasingly were subordinated to those of the nationalist movement.<sup>64</sup> Thus, the government crackdown on the teachers' union and other dissenting intellectuals in the early 1960s was foreshadowed by similar events prior to independence.<sup>65</sup> Nor was the emergence of a one-party state exclusively a post-independence phenomenon. The RDA's electoral sweeps in 1956 and 1957 had emptied Guinea's governing bodies of most RDA opponents, and in September 1958, the RDA's only rival party effectively dissolved itself, bringing to an end organized political opposition.<sup>66</sup> However, the real turning point came in the early years of independence, when France and its allies attempted to subvert Guinea politically, economically, and militarily. Threatened by diplomatic and economic isolation, multiple coup attempts, and finally, a foreign invasion, Sékou Touré's government eventually clamped down on all forms of dissent--in the name of nation-building, national unity, and the struggle against imperialism.<sup>67</sup>

### Conclusion

Fifty years ago, Ghana and Guinea took the lead in spearheading movements for African emancipation from colonialism and neocolonialism, for Pan-African unity, and for an African path to economic development. While their visions continue to inspire today, they were largely unrealized in their time. In Ghana, disgruntled chiefs threw their support behind the military government, which promoted "traditional" values—including the chieftaincy—which Nkrumah's government was said to have undermined.<sup>68</sup> Following the 1966 military coup, Nkrumah went into exile in Guinea, where he received a hero's welcome and was named co-president. He died six years later, without ever having returned to his homeland.<sup>69</sup> In Guinea, a military coup followed Sékou Touré's death in 1984. The new, ethnically-based military government, like its

counterpart in Ghana, also attempted to turn back the clock. In the name of family values, women were ousted from the university and from public life more generally. The regime embarked on a wholesale erasure of Guinean history. Sékou Touré's name and that of the Guinean branch of the RDA were rarely spoken in public. People referred vaguely to the period "before" (the military coup) or to "the previous state president." Independence day was celebrated annually without a single reference to the RDA or its leadership. Old RDA songs were sung on the state-run radio, but with new lyrics that lauded the military regime. Frescoed portraits of Sékou Touré were effaced in towns and cities across the country, leaving only the contours of his silhouette. His famous quotes adorned the walls of government buildings, but his initials were blotted out--the vague outlines still showing through the whitewash. It was as if nearly four decades of Guinean history had never occurred.<sup>70</sup>

In the end, what is Nkrumah's and Touré's legacy in Africa? Many would begin with the negative: the weaknesses of Ghana and Guinea in the independence period foreshadowed similar problems in the states that followed. Other nations also became Cold War battlegrounds, where external interests magnified internal rivalries, destroying nation-building endeavors in the process. As their programs faltered, the leaders of these states also cracked down on internal dissent. I prefer to conclude on a more positive note. The pre-independence parties of Ghana and Guinea were models of popular democracy, mobilizing men and women of diverse ethnic, class, and regional backgrounds. Staunch opponents of "tribalism," Nkrumah and Touré helped to forge national identities and promote unitary states from disparate regional and ethnic components. They succeeded in the face of opposition, not only from the colonial administrations, but from indigenous elites--chiefs, aristocrats, and Western-educated elites.

Criticizing the destructive nature of colonial boundaries, they promoted international solidarity--specifically, Pan-Africanism--as a means of achieving economic and political strength and combating the forces of neocolonialism. The objectives they articulated and strove to achieve, while still unmet, remain the focus of African political activism a half century later. While Nkrumah's and Touré's models were ultimately flawed, they lay the foundation for future models that will continue to carry the program forward. This is a strong legacy indeed.

---

1. See David Apter, *Ghana in Transition* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963); Basil Davidson, *Black Star: A View of the Life and Times of Kwame Nkrumah*, 2nd ed. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989); David Birmingham, *Kwame Nkrumah: The Father of African Nationalism*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1998); Richard Rathbone, *Nkrumah and the Chiefs: The Politics of Chieftaincy in Ghana, 1951-1960* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2000).

2. See Elizabeth Schmidt, *Mobilizing the Masses: Gender, Ethnicity, and Class in the Nationalist Movement in Guinea, 1939-1958* (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 2005); Elizabeth Schmidt, *Cold War and Decolonization in Guinea, 1946-1958* (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2007); Elizabeth Schmidt, "Top Down or Bottom Up? Nationalist Mobilization Reconsidered, With Special Reference to Guinea (French West Africa)," *American Historical Review*, vol. 110, no. 4 (October 2005), 975-1014; Elizabeth Schmidt, "Cold War in Guinea: the Rassemblement Démocratique Africain and the Struggle over Communism, 1950-1958," *Journal of African History*, vol. 48, no. 1 (March 2007), 95-121; Elizabeth Schmidt, "'Emancipate Your Husbands!': Women and Nationalism in Guinea, 1953-1958," in *Women in African Colonial Histories*, eds. Jean Allman, Susan Geiger, and Nakanyike Musisi (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002), 282-304.

3. According to David Birmingham, Macmillan's initial reference to the "wind of change" was so obvious that it attracted no notice in Ghana. It was only when he repeated the statement in Cape Town, South Africa a few days later that the world took notice. It was in Cape Town that Macmillan famously announced that "the wind of change is blowing through this continent, and, whether we like it or not, this growth of national consciousness is a political fact." Independent nations were bound to emerge, and European powers needed to accept this fact and adapt their policies accordingly. Birmingham, *Kwame Nkrumah*, 61; Macmillan quoted in Frank Myers, "Harold Macmillan's 'Winds of Change' Speech: A Case Study in the Rhetoric of Policy Change," *Rhetoric & Public Affairs*, vol. 3, no. 4 (Winter 2000), 556, 559, 564-565.

4. Ali A. Mazrui, "Seek Ye First the Political Kingdom," in *Africa since 1935*, eds. Ali A. Mazrui and C. Wondji, vol. 8 of *General History of Africa* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 109-110.

5. With branches in most of the territories of French West and Equatorial Africa, as well as the United Nations trusts of Togo and Cameroon, the RDA was a diverse alliance of conflicting as well as common interests. The nature of the party leadership and base varied considerably from one territory to another. At its second party congress in October 1950, the Guinean RDA officially assumed the name "Parti Démocratique de Guinée" (PDG). However, Guineans generally continued to refer to their local branch as "the RDA." It was only after independence in 1958, and Guinea's disaffiliation from the interterritorial RDA, that the appellation "PDG" took root. For the Guinean RDA, see Archives Nationales du Sénégal (ANS), 17G573, Guinée Française, Services de Police, Conakry, "Compte-Rendu de la Réunion Publique du Parti

---

Démocratique de Guinée Française (P.D.G.)--Ex-R.D.A.--tenue au Domicile d'Amara Soumah le 24 Octobre 1950 de 18h30 à 20 heures," 25 Oct. 1950, #1248/221, C/PS/BM; Sidiki Kobélé Kéïta, *Le P.D.G.: Artisan de l'Indépendance Nationale en Guinée (1947-1958)* (Conakry: I.N.R.D.G., Bibliothèque Nationale, 1978), 1: 238-239.

6. Recognizing the strength of women's networks and the need for women's emancipation, both parties mobilized women, who in turn organized boycotts and demonstrations, raised money, and promoted the party agenda. Nkrumah's and Toure's notion that women and men are equal was profoundly disturbing to some party members, however, causing considerable tension within the party. With few exceptions, important party positions continued to be dominated by men, while women's power was confined largely to women's affiliated organizations. Birmingham, *Kwame Nkrumah*, 27-28; Schmidt, *Mobilizing the Masses*, chapter 5; Schmidt, "Emancipate Your Husbands!"

7. Birmingham, *Kwame Nkrumah*, 47-48, 53-55.

8. Davidson, *Black Star*, 52-53, 56, 60-61.

9. Ibid., 55-61.

10. Ibid., 66-68.

11. Quoted in Ibid., 68.

12. During World War II, homeless youths who engaged in petty theft and loitered on the porches of trading houses in the urban centers were called "verandah boys." By the 1950s, this term was loosely used to describe urban malcontents in general. Quotation from Davidson, *Black Star*, 70. See also Davidson, *Black Star*, 57, 68, 88; Apter, *Ghana in Transition*, 167, 207-208; Rathbone, *Nkrumah and the Chiefs*, 24; Ruth Schachter Morgenthau, *Political Parties in French-Speaking West Africa* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964), 20-21; Thomas Hodgkin, *African Political Parties: An Introductory Guide* (Gloucester, Ma.: Peter Smith, 1971), 30-31.

13. Quotation from interview with Bocar Biro Barry, Conakry, 21 Jan. 1991. See also Gnan Félix Mathos, "Le R.D.A. et l'Intellectuel," *La Liberté*, no. 44, Jan. 25, 1955, p. 4; Archives de Guinée (AG), AM-1339, Idiatou Camara, "La Contribution de la Femme de Guinée à la Lutte de Libération Nationale (1945-1958)," Mémoire de Fin d'Études Supérieures, Conakry, IPGAN, 1979, p. 42; communication from Siba N. Grovogui, 1988.

Ruth Schachter Morgenthau contends that strains between the more and less educated Guinean elites were comparable to those that existed in the Gold Coast. Morgenthau, *Political Parties in French-Speaking West Africa*, 20-21.

14. Morgenthau, *Political Parties in French-Speaking West Africa*, 12, 20, 251; Jean Suret-Canale, *La République de Guinée* (Paris: Éditions Sociales, 1970), 142-143. For further

---

discussion of the hierarchical educational system in French West Africa, see Schmidt, "Top Down or Bottom Up," 998-1001; Peggy R. Sabatier, "'Elite' Education in French West Africa: The Era of Limits, 1903-1945," *International Journal of African Historical Studies*, vol. 11, no. 2 (1978), 247-266.

15. ANS, 17G573, "Rapport Général d'Activité 1947-1950," présenté par Mamadou Madéïra Kéïta, Secrétaire Général, PDG, au Premier Congrès Territorial du Parti Démocratique de Guinée (Section Guinéenne du Rassemblement Démocratique Africain), Conakry, 15-18 Oct. 1950; Morgenthau, *Political Parties in French-Speaking West Africa*, 20, 251; Suret-Canale, *République de Guinée*, 142-143.

16. Morgenthau, *Political Parties in French-Speaking West Africa*, 20-21.

17. Interview with Bocar Biro Barry, 21 Jan. 1991; Suret-Canale, *République de Guinée*, 142; Sidiki Kobélé Kéïta, *Ahmed Sékou Touré: L'Homme et son Combat Anti-Colonial (1922-1958)* (Conakry: Éditions S.K.K., 1998), 10-11, 30.

18. AG, 1E41, Guinée Française, Services de Police, "Fiche de Renseignements Biographiques Relative à M. Sékou Touré," 2 Jan. 1956; Morgenthau, *Political Parties in French-Speaking West Africa*, 12, 20, 251; Suret-Canale, *République de Guinée*, 142-143, 147; Kéïta, *Ahmed Sékou Touré: Combat Anti-Colonial*, 24, 29, 32, 36; Sidiki Kobélé Kéïta, *Ahmed Sékou Touré: L'Homme du 28 Septembre 1958*, 2nd ed. (Conakry: I.N.R.D.G., Bibliothèque Nationale, 1977), 29, 31; B. Ameillon, *La Guinée: Bilan d'une Indépendance* (Paris: François Maspero, 1964), 49.

19. Birmingham, *Kwame Nkrumah*, 54, 57; Rathbone, *Nkrumah and the Chiefs*, 21-24; Schmidt, *Mobilizing the Masses*, chapter 4.

20. See Rathbone, *Nkrumah and the Chiefs*, 21-22; Schmidt, *Mobilizing the Masses*, Introduction.

21. Fodéba Kéïta, "Rapport du IVème Congrès sur les Réformes Administratives et les Nouvelles Structures," *La Liberté*, 25 July 1958, p. 3; interview with Mamadou Bela Doumbouya, Conakry, 26 Jan. 1991; Kéïta, *P.D.G.*, 2: 67, 69, 147; Ameillon, *Guinée*, 24-25; Suret-Canale, *République de Guinée*, 164; Jean Suret-Canale, "La Fin de la Chefferie en Guinée," *Journal of African History*, vol. 7, no. 3 (1966), 459-460, 490, 492-493; Schmidt, *Mobilizing the Masses*, chapter 4; Schmidt, *Cold War and Decolonization in Guinea*, chapters 2, 3, and 5.

22. Davidson, *Black Star*, 79-82, 85.

23. *Ibid.*, 85, 87, 92.

24. *Ibid.*, 92.

- 
25. Morgenthau, *Political Parties in French-Speaking West Africa*, 66, 71-72; Jean-Pierre Rioux, *The Fourth Republic, 1944-1958*, trans. Godfrey Rogers (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 216-218, 227-228, 237-239, 244-245; Ivan Hrbek, "North Africa and the Horn," in *Africa since 1935*, eds. Ali A. Mazrui and C. Wondji, vol. 8 of *General History of Africa* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 127-137; Tony Chafer, *The End of Empire in French West Africa: France's Successful Decolonization?* (New York: Berg, 2002), 145.
26. ANS, 20G136, Télégramme Départ, Afcours, à tous Gouverneurs, 4 July 1956, #80237; 20G136, Télégramme Départ, Haut Commissaire, Dakar, à tous Gouverneurs, 20 July 1956, #80266; 20G136, Gouverneur, Guinée Française, Conakry, à Haut Commissaire, Dakar, "Objet: Suffrage Universel dans les T.O.M.," 3 Aug. 1956, #2072, CB/SL.
27. Morgenthau, *Political Parties in French-Speaking West Africa*, 66.
28. Schmidt, *Cold War and Decolonization in Guinea*, chapter 4.
29. Morgenthau, *Political Parties in French-Speaking West Africa*, 68.
30. Davidson, *Black Star*, 93.
31. *Ibid.*, 105-14.
32. See Schmidt, *Mobilizing the Masses*, chapter 7; Schmidt, *Cold War and Decolonization in Guinea*, chapters 5 and 6.
33. Birmingham, *Kwame Nkrumah*, 101-105; Schmidt, *Cold War and Decolonization in Guinea*, chapter 6.
34. Hugh Seton-Watson, *Nations and States: An Enquiry into the Origins of Nations and the Politics of Nationalism*, 339; Anthony D. Smith, *State and Nation in the Third World: The Western State and African Nationalism* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983), 54.
- Although the Pan-African Movement is typically associated with anglophone of peoples of the African diaspora and leaders such as W.E.B. Du Bois, George Padmore, C.L.R. James, and Kwame Nkrumah, its ideology and objectives were very much a part of significant strands of francophone African nationalism.
35. For elaboration on the territorialist vs. federalist debate, see Schmidt, *Cold War and Decolonization in Guinea*, chapter 5.
36. Birmingham, *Kwame Nkrumah*, 99; Davidson, *Black Star*, 164-65.
37. Kwame Nkrumah, *I Speak of Freedom: A Statement of African Ideology* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1961), 167-68. See also Birmingham, *Kwame Nkrumah*, 47-48, 53-55.

- 
38. Georges Chaffard, *Les Carnets Secrets de la Décolonisation* (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1967), 2: 189; Jacques Foccart, *Foccart Parle: Entretiens avec Philippe Gaillard* (Paris: Fayard/Jeune Afrique, 1995), 1: 159, 166; Edward Mortimer, *France and the Africans 1944-1960: A Political History* (New York: Walker and Co., 1969), 311-312.
39. Suret-Canale, *République de Guinée*, 122-132, 172-173; Chaffard, *Carnets Secrets de la Décolonisation*, 2: 218, 220; Foccart, *Foccart Parle*, 1: 172; Mortimer, *France and the Africans*, 329-330; Victor D. Du Bois, "The Guinean Vote for Independence: The Maneuvering Before the Referendum of September 28, 1958," *American Universities Field Staff, West Africa Series*, vol. 5, no. 7 (1962), 10-11; Charles de Gaulle, *Memoirs of Hope: Renewal and Endeavor*, trans. by Terence Kilmartin (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1971), 56; Claude Rivière, *Guinea: The Mobilization of a People*, trans. Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977), 84. See also Schmidt, *Cold War and Decolonization in Guinea*, chapter 6.
40. Morgenthau, *Political Parties in French-Speaking West Africa*, 74; Mortimer, *France and the Africans*, 333; Suret-Canale, *République de Guinée*, 172; Kéïta, *P.D.G.*, 2: 149; Rivière, *Guinea*, 83; John H. Morrow, *First American Ambassador to Guinea* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1968), 37.
41. Chaffard, *Carnets Secrets de la Décolonisation*, 2: 218, 220; Kéïta, *P.D.G.*, 2: 149; Pierre Messmer, *Après Tant de Batailles: Mémoires* (Paris: Albin Michel, 1992), 242.
42. Roger Faligot and Pascal Krop, *La Piscine: Les Services Secrets Français, 1944-1984* (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1985), 246-247.
43. Suret-Canale, *République de Guinée*, 172; Chaffard, *Carnets Secrets de la Décolonisation*, 2: 218, 220; Mortimer, *France and the Africans*, 333; Kéïta, *P.D.G.*, 2: 149.
44. Kéïta, *P.D.G.*, 2: 149.
45. Centre des Archives d'Outre-Mer, Archives Nationales de France (CAOM), Carton 2181, dos. 6, Bordereau du Ministre, FOM, Paris, 29 Sept. 1958, #1997/BE: Service de Documentation Extérieure et de Contre-Espionnage (SDECE), "Bulletin de Renseignements A/S Inquiétudes aux États Unis sur le Sort de la Guinée Française et du Niger," 26 Sept. 1958, #11424/A; Carton 2181, dos. 6, Directeur, Direction des Affaires Politiques, "Note pour Monsieur le Ministre, *Objet*: Attitude des États-Unis à l'Égard de la Guinée," 27 Sept. 1958; Foccart, *Foccart Parle*, 1: 176; Mortimer, *France and the Africans*, 332.
46. Morrow, *First American Ambassador to Guinea*, 36, 68-69, 248-251; Suret-Canale, *République de Guinée*, 175.

---

47. Morrow, *First American Ambassador to Guinea*, 36-38, 61-62, 67-68, 79-80, 130-131; Chaffard, *Carnets Secrets de la Décolonisation*, 2: 215; Faligot and Krop, *La Piscine*, 245; "African Frontier," *Look*, vol. 26, no. 15 (July 17, 1962), 80, 86.

48. CAOM, Carton 2181, dos. 7, Carton 2181, dos. 7, Haut Commissaire de l'AOF, Bobo-Dioulasso, à Ministre, FOM, Paris, "Référendum du 28 Septembre," 17 Sept. 1958, T/0 #3987/3986/3988; Mortimer, *France and the Africans*, 331-332; Messmer, *Après Tant de Batailles*, 242; Immanuel Wallerstein, "How Seven States Were Born in Former French West Africa," *Africa Report* (March 1961), 4.

49. Kéïta, *P.D.G.*, 2: 154.

50. Chaffard, *Carnets Secrets de la Décolonisation*, 2: 217, 234-235; Mortimer, *France and the Africans*, 331; Messmer, *Après Tant de Batailles*, 242; Wallerstein, "How Seven States Were Born," 4.

These sentiments were echoed by Jacques Foccart, Prime Minister de Gaulle's chief Africa adviser, who supervised Africa-related activities of the French secret services (Service de Documentation Extérieure et de Contre-Espionnage or SDECE) during this period. See Foccart, *Foccart Parle*, 1: 172; Faligot and Krop, *La Piscine*, 27, 225-226.

51. Kéïta, *P.D.G.*, 2: 158. See also note 5, above.

52. Sylvain Soriba Camara, *La Guinée sans la France* (Paris: Presses de la Fondation Nationale Des Sciences Politiques, 1976), 116.

53. Birmingham, *Kwame Nkrumah*, 99-100; Davidson, *Black Star*, 165; Kevin C. Dunn, *Imagining the Congo: The International Relations of Identity* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 75-76.

54. Nkrumah, *I Speak of Freedom*, 175-176. See also Davidson, *Black Star*, 187-188.

55. Nkrumah, *I Speak of Freedom*, 176-177, 232; Mazrui, "Seek Ye First the Political Kingdom," 108; Camara, *Guinée sans la France*, 116; Keita, *P.D.G.*, 2: 159; "Ghana-Guinea-Mali Union (Union of African States)," *International Organization*, vol. 16, no. 2 (Spring 1962): 443-44; Aly Gilbert Iffono, *Lexique Historique de la Guinée-Conakry* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1992), 168.

56. Davidson, *Black Star*, 36-43, 49, 165, 187-89; Birmingham, *Kwame Nkrumah*, 100.

57. "Constitutive Act of the African Union," [http://www.au2002.gov.za/docs/key\\_oau/au\\_act.htm](http://www.au2002.gov.za/docs/key_oau/au_act.htm); "Transition from the OAU to the African Union," [http://www.au2002.gov.za/docs/background/oau\\_to\\_au.htm](http://www.au2002.gov.za/docs/background/oau_to_au.htm).

---

58. For Ghana, see Davidson, *Black Star*, chapter 4; Birmingham, *Kwame Nkrumah*, chapter 3. For Guinea, see Chaffard, *Carnets Secrets de la Décolonisation*, 2: 218-219, 236-251, 259-261; Faligot and Krop, *La Piscine*, 217, 226, 245-249, 252, 335-337; Foccart, *Foccart Parle*, 1: 166, 175; Foccart, *Foccart Parle*, 2: 193-194; Rivière, *Guinea*, 121-140; Mortimer, *France and the Africans*, 335; L. Gray Cowan, "Guinea," in *African One-Party States*, ed. Gwendolen M. Carter (New York: Cornell University Press, 1962), 229; R.W. Johnson, "Sekou Touré and the Guinean Revolution," *African Affairs*, vol. 69, no. 277 (Oct. 1970), 357-358; Bernard Charles, *La République de Guinée* (Paris: Éditions Berger-Levrault, 1972), 32; Lansiné Kaba, "Guinean Politics: a Critical Historical Overview," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, vol. 15, no. 1 (1977), 33.

59. Davidson, *Black Star*, chapter 4; Birmingham, *Kwame Nkrumah*, chapter 3; Rathbone, *Nkrumah and the Chiefs*, 21-22.

60. For Guinea, see Rivière, *Guinea*; Ameillon, *Guinée*; Camara, *Guinée sans la France*; Kaba, "Guinean Politics," 25-45; Cowan, "Guinea," 149-236; Victor D. Du Bois, "The Problems of Independence: The Decolonization of Guinea," *American Universities Field Staff, West Africa Series*, vol. 5, no. 8 (1962), 1-18; Victor D. Du Bois, "Reorganization of the Guinean Economy: The Attempt to Remove the Economic Vestiges of Colonialism," *American Universities Field Staff, West Africa Series*, vol. 6, no. 1 (1963): 1-22; Victor D. Du Bois, "The Decline of the Guinean Revolution," *American Universities Field Staff, West Africa Series*, vol. 8, nos. 7-9 (1965); Victor D. Du Bois, "The Rise of an Opposition to Sékou Touré," *American Universities Field Staff, West Africa Series*, vol. 9, nos. 1-5, 7 (1966); Charles, *République de Guinée*; Bernard Charles, *Guinée* (Lausanne: Éditions Recontre, 1963); Bernard Charles, *Guinée et Son Régime Politique* (Paris: Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1963); Ladipo Adamolekun, *Sékou Touré's Guinea: An Experiment in Nation Building* (London: Methuen, 1976).

61. Davidson, *Black Star*, chapter 4; Birmingham, *Kwame Nkrumah*, chapter 3.

62. AG, 1E41, Guinée Française, Services de Police, "Renseignements A/S Réunion R.D.A.," 5 Dec. 1951, #2282/1293/C/PS.2; 1E41, Guinée Française, Services de Police, "Renseignements A/S Réunion R.D.A.," 19 Dec. 1951, #2394/1350/C/PS.2; CAOM, Carton 2144, dos. 1, Ministre, FOM, "Rapport Pruvost," 31 Mars 1955; ANS, 2G55/150, Guinée Française, Gouverneur, "Rapport Politique Mensuel, Juillet 1955," #435/APAS/CAB; Centre de Recherche et de Documentation Africaine (CRDA), PDG, Bureau Directeur, Sous-Section de Mamou, au Comité Directeur du PDG, Conakry, 1 Aug. 1955, in *P.D.G.-R.D.A., Parti Démocratique de Guinée, 1947-1960: Les Sections--Les Syndicats*; interviews in Conakry with Aissatou N'Diaye, 8 April 1991; Néné Diallo, 11 April 1991; Fatou Kéïta, 28 April and 24 May 1991; Ibrahima Fofana, 24 May 1991.

---

63. Kéïta, *P.D.G.*, 1: 180, 186, 308-309, 311; Kéïta, *Ahmed Sékou Touré: Combat Anti-Colonial*, 88-94; Morgenthau, *Political Parties in French-Speaking West Africa*, 229, 246, 394; Rivière, *Guinea*, 60, 86-87; Adamolekun, *Sékou Touré's Guinea*, 11; Suret-Canale, "Fin de la Chefferie," 482; Suret-Canale, *République de Guinée*, 164; R.W. Johnson, "The Parti Démocratique de Guinée and the Mamou 'Deviation,'" in *African Perspectives: Papers in the History, Politics and Economics of Africa Presented to Thomas Hodgkin*, ed. Christopher Allen and R.W. Johnson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), 349.

64. See Schmidt, *Cold War and Decolonization in Guinea*, chapter 5.

65. For the post-independence crackdown on intellectuals, see Rivière, *Guinea*, 127-128; Ameillon, *Guinée*, 179-181; Cowan, "Guinea," 203-204; Camara, *Guinée Sans La France*, 175-176; Charles, *République de Guinée*, 31; Kaba, "Guinean Politics," 30; Johnson, "Sekou Touré and the Guinean Revolution," 357-358.

66. Kéïta, *P.D.G.*, 2: 166, 190-191; Suret-Canale, *République de Guinée*, 172; Du Bois, "Guinean Vote for Independence," 6, 8.

67. See Schmidt, *Cold War and Decolonization in Guinea*, chapter 6.

68. See Rathbone, *Nkrumah and the Chiefs*, 21-22.

69. Birmingham, *Kwame Nkrumah*, 120; Davidson, *Black Star*, 204-5.

70. See Schmidt, *Mobilizing the Masses*, Introduction.